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1. Introduction 
This thesis is dedicated to you. That does not mean it was designed for 
a specific person, a special reader to whom this shall be given as a 
present. My decision to dedicate this to an anonymous and at the same 
time all-too-close you (‘all-too-close’ because this you is addressed to 
each and every reader opening this book in the same way) is 
determined by the fact that it is the very status of this you that serves 
as the point of interrogation for the following inquiry into the 
possibilities and limits of what I will call the communal body of a 
political collective. 
To claim that there is a you at stake when talking about questions of 
political collectives – which could also be called political bodies or 
rather a political body –, subjective intervention, and the fundamental 
conditions at the center of any socio-symbolic community is to say 
that the questions I will be dealing with revolve around the notion of 
the Other. These questions not only interrogate the role played by the 
Other (with a capital O) in the inauguration of any I (any autonomous 
subject), but also – and perhaps more decisively – the role played by 
the small other, our Nebenmensch, in the construction of any sense of 
community. Therefore, the term ‘body’ in the title should be 
understood in its twofold meaning – as the body of a community, a 
state, as composed of a multiplicity of individuals, an envelope which 
provides shelter for our being, i.e. a certain form of community, as 
well as our individual bodies, perceived as autonomous units acting 
(seemingly) freely within this larger body of the community. 
As we shall see, the notion of the body – and the many ways of saying 
‘body’ – will thus serve as the very hinge for the following attempt, 
the hard kernel around which everything else vibrates and achieves 
consistency. But in order to come to terms with this concept, another 
signifier will – of necessity – require introduction–  that is, the notion 
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of the subject and the process of subjectivation. Before dealing with 
the neighbor in her bodily presence and the implications of this 
presence for forms of political intervention I will, in a first step, 
examine the ontological status of subjectivity and subjectivation in 
order to both determine the contours of the subject in the process of 
political intervention (i.e. in the steady labor of re-petition, re-
signation, and re-signification), and extricate the relation between the 
notion of the subject and that of the body, a relation that calls for a 
distinction between – as Alain Badiou names it in his latest book –
being and appearing.1 
After a general introduction to the topic which sets the parameters for 
my understanding of subjectivity and its relation to the symbolic 
system (i.e. as a system subjected to the interplay between metonymy 
and metaphor as has been delineated by Jacques Lacan) the second 
part of my thesis will encompass three different approaches towards a 
practical understanding of the implications drawn from my first 
inquiry. 
Chapter 3 will build on the theoretical inquiries into the constitution 
of the subject carried out in the first part (Chapter 2.1. and 2.2.), while 
providing for different readings of subjectivity as found in Alain 
Badiou and Jacques Derrida in order to come up with a notion of 
subjectivity which is able to grasp the subject in both her functions – 
as one of breach as well as continuity (‘one signifier for another’). 
Chapter 4 will examine the insights gained from the previous chapters 
and will make use of them to better understand the role of the work of 
art in the process of political intervention. In this respect, the art-work 
shall be conceived of as the materialization of a certain form of 
                                                           
1
 Badiou, Alain: Logics of Worlds. London, New York: Continuum 2009. 
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constitutive negativity, as a mode of thinking rather than an aesthetic 
practice.  
The final chapter, Chapter 5, will examine the role the body plays in 
the inauguration of a (political) community. How, I ask, do bodies 
appear? In what way can we speak of our body as an autonomous unit 
over which we have full command? And how can we account for 
those whose bodies seem to not be re-presented within the political 
space of the ‘state of a situation?’ 
In other, i.e. Badiou’s, words, the second part will cover three of the 
four conditions in which events (that is to say, fundamental and radical 
change) can take place. One chapter will follow the discourse of 
science (the explication of the status of the subject within the 
symbolic system of language), another will concern itself with the 
importance of art in this process, while another will examine the 
connection between the body and the political sphere (and will, 
therefore, argue within a political discourse) … yet, there will not be a 
separate chapter on the notion of love – Badiou’s fourth condition. 
Such a chapter need not be included because, quite frankly, love is to 
be located throughout each and every chapter insofar as this work is 
for and about you, insofar as it examines what is at stake in any 
interaction between one and the o/Other. Such a chapter need not be 
included because it is love that is what is needed for each event; it is 
as, Lacan tells us, all that is needed to ‘make the discourse change.’ 
2.  
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2.1. Performativity – Repetition and the Signifying 
Chain 
As noted above, the main point of interest in this paper – or, to speak 
in Lacanian terms, its ‘quilting point’ – is the political body of the 
subject. Here, three different yet related signifiers present themselves 
as the cause of three fundamental questions at the heart of this 
enquiry: ‘How does the notion of the ‘subject’ (after “the end of the 
subject”) have to be conceptualized (if not to say symbolized)?;’ 
‘What is this sphere called the political proper2?;’ and finally ‘What 
relation does the body – in its dual signification as that of the 
individual body of a singular person as well as the communal body of 
the political collective – assume relative to this political sphere?’  
In pursuing this project my first task will be to raise yet another 
question which is directly linked to the ones just presented. I begin 
this chapter by focusing on performativity and the notorious concept 
of différance in their relation to my third question (‘What relation 
does the body…assume relative to this political sphere?’). I 
distinguish the ‘individual body of a singular person’ from what I call 
the ‘communal body of the political collective,’ or the political body 
of a community to come3. One question immediately arises: ‘Is this 
distinction between the individual and the collective, the singleton and 
the multiple, really as straightforward, as unproblematic as it appears 
to be when it is wrapped up in a phrase such as ‘the individual body of 
a singular person as well as the communal body of the political 
collective’?’ If one were to respond from the pre-critical (or pre-
deconstructive), occidental perspective of metaphysics (a tradition 
                                                           
2
 As opposed to a mere ‘politics of opinion,’ a ‘weak politics,’ or a ‘politcs of 
disasters.’ For more on these concepts see for example recent works by Alain 
Badiou and Slavoj Žižek: Badiou, Alain: Conditions. London, New York: 
Continuum 2006. Badiou, Alain: Conditions. London, New York 2008. Badiou, 
Alain: Saint Paul. The Foundation of Universalism. Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press 
2003. Žižek, Slavoj: In Defense of Lost Causes. London, New York: Verso 2008. 
3
 Chapter 5 will explain the approach behind this expression in further detail. 
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which still seems to be the decisive ideological framework for the 
western tradition) the answer would surely be: ‘Yes, indeed, it’s as 
simple as that. Here I am … and there you are. This is a subject … and 
that’s an object. Here we are … and there is the o/Other. This is my 
writing … and that’s my speaking. I am thinking … now I am doing. 
When I am thinking, I am (me, i.e. a self-determined thinking being) 
... I am … I … I think … cogito ergo sum4.’ 
That dichotomist pairs such as the ones just parodied are not as 
unproblematic and pre-given as they might appear has become evident 
since the linguistic turn, if not sooner.5 Beside linguists such as 
Roman Jacobson6 and Ferdinand de Saussure,7 one should recall John 
L. Austin’s lectures on the question ‘How to do things with words?’8 
as having contributed to the breaking down of the false binary pairs of 
western metaphysics. Austin’s merit was to point towards the 
impossibility of a clear cut distinction between ‘saying’ and ‘doing,’ 
between ‘speech’ and ‘acts.’ It happens that we sometimes seem to do 
something as we say something, that an action is being carried out, 
that we not only express a statement (represent a content, object, or 
signified via a sign or signified), but the words themselves  put 
                                                           
4
 Cf. Descartes Rene: Meditations on First Philosophy: In Which the Existence of God 
and the Distinction of the Soul from the Body Are Demonstrated. Indianapolis: Hackett 
Publishing Company 1993. 
5
 In this respect, one could argue that the dialectical method already had a 
‘deconstructive aura’ to it insofar as it was able to animate the static model of an 
unproblematic and pre-given dichotomy. Aristotle has already argued that it is not 
enough to think of the object as a given, pre-existing thing ‘for itself.’ For him, the 
object (hypochaimenon) only comes into existence through the predicative effect of a 
subject. Cf. Aristotle: Metaphysics. Sioux Falls: NuVision Publications 2009. While it 
is true that Hegel already knew about the significance of the signifier (and its 
domination over the signified), one could still claim that it was not until Jacques 
Lacan’s logic of the signifier that this insight was pushed to its extreme. Or, in other 
words, while Hegel’s dialecticic can be thought as a reconciliatory one, Lacan’s 
dialectic remains a purely negative one, one that never adds up, always producing a (as I 
will try to delineate in this chapter, following Derrida) constitutive remainder. Cf. 
Hegel, G.W.F.: Phänomenologie des Geistes. Werke. Bd.3. Frankfurt am Main: 
Suhrkamp 1986. 
6
 Jakobson, Roman: Fundamentals of Language. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter 2002. 
7
 De Saussure, Ferdinand: Course in General Linguistics. Chicago: Open Court 1998.  
8
 Austin, John L.: How to do things with words. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press 
1962. 
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something into action, stage it … they perform. These ‘speech acts’ or 
performatives differ in nature from the other group of utterances, the 
constatives. While, according to Austin, constatives can still be 
evaluated in relation to their truth-value (they can be either true/or 
false ) – the distinction is unproblematic –, this is no longer possible 
when it comes to the evaluation of speech acts.9 Another interesting 
feature of performatives is the double nature of their performances. 
They not only perform an action, they also play a game of ‘as if …’: 
“The type of utterance we are to consider here is not, of 
course, in general a type of nonsense; though misuse of it 
can, as we shall see, engender rather special varieties of 
‘nonsense’. Rather, it is one of our second class – the 
masquerades. But it does not by any means necessarily 
masquerade as a statement of fact, descriptive or 
constatives. Yet it does quite commonly do so, and that, 
oddly enough, when it assumes its most explicit form.“10 
(my emphasis) 
This is where Austin’s agenda, which is generally a polemic against 
the dominant linguistic tradition and analytic philosophy, becomes 
most clear. There is something in language which cannot be sublated 
in categories such as true/false, something that is speech (or writing) 
but that cannot be regarded as a simple re-presentation of reality, 
something that might look like a constative (or descriptive) statement, 
but is actually something entirely different trying to fool us by its 
clever play of masquerade. Now it is our task to look behind the mask 
and see the fundamental difference which subdivides speech into that 
which describes and that which does: 
“Grammarians have not, I believe, seen through this 
‘disguise’, and philosophers only at best incidentally. It 
will be convenient, therefore, to study it first in this 
misleading form, in order to bring out its characteristics by 
                                                           
9
 Ibid, p.9. 
10
 Ibid, p.4. 
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contrasting them with those of the statement of fact which 
it apes.“11 
And this is what Austin, in the course of his lecture series, then does. 
He not only distinguishes between constatives and performatives, but 
subdivides the power of the performative into a ‘locutionary’ force 
and an ‘illocutionary’ force.12 Here, the significance of the ‘o/Other’ is 
already introduced. For locutionary and illocutionary acts can only be 
distinguished from one another insofar as they are intended in 
different ways by the speaker; in that the speaker (or sender) wants to 
achieve a different result in the listener (or receiver). Locutionary acts 
are all those which convey meaning (X tells Y ‘I’ll be here 
tomorrow.’) whereas X might utter exactly the same sentence at 
another time and it will be an illocutionary act. He says: ‘I’ll be here 
tomorrow,’ but what he means is ‘Beware, I’ll be back,’ ‘I promise, 
I’ll come back to you,’ ‘Be scared, I’ll be back to crush you.’ A 
sentence such as ‘I’ll be here tomorrow,’ can – when doubled – 
remain semantically as well as grammatically identical at the same 
time as each sentence intends something quite different – a promise as 
opposed to a warning for example. The ‘something’ added to the 
speech act through the speaker’s intention is the illocutionary force. 
The last category of acts introduced by Austin is the perlocutionary 
acts. These can be regarded as a follow-up to illocutionary acts. While 
illocutionary acts focus on the sender and her intention (to utter a 
promise, warning, or threat), perlocutionary acts are to be situated on 
the side of the receiver. X says: ‘I’ll be here tomorrow.’; maybe he 
intends his utterance to be a threat; and maybe Y takes it as such. This 
is the perlocutionary force – X utters a sentence, and Y believes it.13 
                                                           
11
 Ibid, p.4. 
12
 Ibid, pp.91-94. 
13
 Ibid, p.91. 
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Lastly, Austin takes into consideration the possibility that speech acts 
may also fail, that something might go wrong and prevent the act from 
being carried out felicitously; the result is thus an infelicity.14 The 
receiver might not understand, for example, that there is a warning 
behind the speech act disguised as a simple constative statement; the 
sender might incorrectly make use of a convention (and therefore 
frustrate the understanding of the receiver); or the convention might 
be correct but might be used in the wrong circumstances … you get 
the idea. In his second lecture, Austin tells us that both infelicities and 
another form of speech acts (‘parasitic’ uses of language) shall not be 
considered in his inquiry.15 The ‘parasites’ Austin has in mind are 
quotations, like the utterances delivered by actors on stage: 
“[A] performative utterance will, for example, be in a 
peculiar way hollow or void if said by an actor on the 
stage, or if introduced in a poem, or spoken in soliloquy. 
This applies in a similar manner to any and every 
utterance – a sea-change in special circumstances. 
Language in such circumstances is in special ways – 
intelligibly – used not seriously, but in ways parasitic 
upon its normal use – ways which fall under the doctrine 
of the etiolations of language. All this we are excluding 
from consideration. Our performative utterances, felicitous 
or not, are to be understood as issued in ordinary 
circumstances.“16 
So, let us briefly sum up these interventions so as to underline their 
relevance for the further explication of my argument: 
(1) The binary pair of either doing or saying has to be 
regarded as highly problematic because there seems to 
exist utterances which no longer describe an object, 
process or event, but rather turn themselves into an event, 
                                                           
14
 Ibid, pp.14-45. 
15
 Ibid, p.22. 
16
 Ibid, p.18. 
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i.e. through speaking these sentences the speaker is 
carrying out, is performing an act(ion). 
(2) These performatives (or speech acts) play a game of 
masquerade. They appear to be ‘normal’ constative 
utterances but are fundamentally different in reality. 
Performatives play two games at the same time: they put 
something into action at the same time as they act in order 
to conceal (to mask) this fact. 
(3) Performatives are dependent on intersubjective 
relations (on the relation between a sender equipped with 
illocutionary force and a receiver picking up on a 
statements’ perlocutionary force). A sentence will function 
as a performative or a constative because of the sender and 
the receiver.  
(4) Quotations are to be considered as parasitic (as they 
lack proper sender-intention as well as sincerity on the 
side of the receiver) and thus must not be considered in 
any further inquiries into this topic. They are abnormal, 
and only the normal language uses shall be considered. 
 
Austin warrants mention in any work concerned with performativity 
and the political body because he is not only– as has been stated 
before –one of the key figures in what has become to be called the 
‘linguistic turn,’ but is also – and perhaps more importantly - 
responsible for introducing a notion of the act that is carried out 
through language – see number (1). Aside from his having introduced 
the notions of performance and the performative in theoretical 
inquiries, Austin is here extensively made use of  because the 
establishment of his own work will lay the groundwork for further 
14 
 
reflections which will illustrate the ways in which his ‘turn’ did not go 
far enough, the ways in which his argument – and polemics – against 
the rest of the linguistic community and the guild of (analytic) 
philosophers, remained deeply tied to this very tradition he tried so 
hard to free himself from. Arguing against too simple an 
understanding of language, performance and the notion of the act, 
Austin nevertheless did not manage to free himself – as Jacques 
Derrida puts it – from “the most tenacious and the most central 
presuppositions of the continental metaphysical”17 tradition, a  
tradition built on givenness instead of contingency, of presence as 
opposed to absence, and on singularity not repeatability (or, in 
Derrida’s words – iterability). 
But the distinction between constatives and performatives in Austin is 
not as straightforward as it might appear at first glance. Derrida took 
great effort to delineate this in his reading of Austin’s ‘How to do 
things with words.’ In Sec (Signature Event Context),18 the first 
occidental, metaphysical presupposition Derrida points out in Austin’s 
work is the conviction that to communicate (to speak) is equivalent to 
transporting “a meaning, and moreover a unified meaning.”19 Or, in 
other words, Derrida turns against the assumption that there are – and 
here he follows Condillac20 – only two reasons why we speak21: (1) 
because we have to communicate and (2) because what we have to 
communicate are our ‘thoughts,’ our ‘ideas,’ the representations or 
                                                           
17
 Derrida, Jacques: Limited Inc a b c … . In: Derrida, Jacques: Limited Inc a b c … . 
Evanston: Northwestern University Press 1988. p.38. 
18
 Derrida, Jacques: Signature Event Context. In: Derrida, Jacques: Limited Inc a b c … 
. Evanston: Northwestern University Press 1988. 
19
 Ibid, p.1. 
20
 Condilllac, Etienne Bonnot de: Essay on the Origin of Human Knowledge. 
Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press 2001. 
21
 At this point, Condillac is not so much interested in speech but in writing. This is why 
the two reasons he mentions are put forward as an answer to the question “why men 
write.” That this clear cut opposition is, however, not as straight forward as it seems, 
that it is to be regarded as another presuppositions of occidental metaphysics shall be 
delineated in the course of this chapter. 
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symbols glued to the objects which form our world. The disavowed 
presupposition shaping Austin’s entire theory is that, despite the fact 
that there might be exceptions (the speech acts), there exists a 
fundamental function of language: to “depict [dessiner] images of 
things”22 in a way that positions the signifier ‘over’ the signified: 
 
 
According to this presupposition, the primacy belongs to the object 
and the signifier re-presents the object us, a word describes a thing-at-
hand. In this respect, the object is turned into an unproblematic, pre-
given entity which exists already for-itself, which is present and only 
presented once more (in more abstract, i.e. linguistic) when it is re-
presented in language.  
 
Representation = Communication = Expression23 
 
It follows that when communicating, we express ourselves by re-
presenting the world given around us – signifier over signified. 
Arbitrarily attached to the signifier, the signified joins the signifier to 
from a couple in which these two different entities are separated from 
each other but belong to one another and form a perfectly closed pair: 
                                                           
22
 Derrida, Jacques: Sec, p.4. 
23
 Ibid, p.5. 
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The teachings of Jacques Lacan (himself following Saussure’s model 
of language), his radical continuation of Freud’s Copernican 
revolution, draw, however, a very different picture of this relation and 
must be regarded as a massive contribution to the re-evaluation (and 
even deconstruction) of the above mentioned pre-critical metaphysical 
tradition. In his “return to Freud,” Lacan moves beyond the latter by 
emphasizing the power and primacy of the signifier.24  
In sharp contrast to Austin, Lacan points out that “language is not to 
be confused with the various psychical and somatic functions that 
serve it in the speaking subject.”25 Language is irreducible to its 
function as a means of communication. Austin’s exclusion of 
‘parasitic’ uses of language – quotations, speeches on stage which do 
not express the sender’s intention by representing a piece of reality 
and which cannot have a perlocutionary effect on the receiver because 
they do not relate to her ‘as a whole person’ – might, therefore, have 
been too hasty. In fact, Derrida argues that it is exactly these 
‘parasites’ which point towards a key fundamental feature in 
                                                           
24
 Instead of focusing on explanations of a mythical kind (the Ur-Vater as a real, living 
individual, a proto-biblical figure at the beginning of history proper, the Oedipus 
complex as the little boy’s ‘real’ desire for his mother, the little girl envying her brother 
for his ‘real’ penis etc.), Lacan introduced a highly formalist discourse into 
psychoanalysis. His focus was centered on functions rather than persons, on language as 
a system rather than as a means of communication, the introduction of the ‘letter’ as the 
inauguration of the subject rather than the referee belonging to an object-referent. 
This, however, does not mean that Lacan did not produce his own myths; quite the 
contrary, but they were nevetheless of a different nature. Bruce Fink gives an account of 
the Lacanian myth. Cf. Fink, Bruce: A Clinical Introduction to Lacanian 
Psychoanalysis. Theory and Technique. Cambridge (MA): Harvard Univ. Press 2000. 
25
 Lacan, Jacques: The Instance of the Letter in the Unconscious or Reason Since Freud. 
In: Lacan, Jacques: Écrits. The First Complete Edition in English. New York, London: 
W.W. Norton & Company 2006. pp.412-441, here: p.413. 
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language.26 For, what Austin failed to acknowledge in his account is 
that every sign (or, in Lacanese ‘letter’) is graphematic in general27 
and thus part of a structure, a text; or, to put it differently – these signs 
cannot be treated in any form of singularity but have to be seen as 
links in a “signifying chain.”28 
Lacan takes great effort to show that “no signification can be 
sustained except by reference to another signification.”29 For, what 
Lacan meant when he warned that language cannot be regarded as a 
simple medium humans make use of in order to express their thoughts, 
those supposedly unproblematic representations of reality, is that the 
primary and (quite literally) most vital function of language is to 
provide us with a structure. It is a symbolic system which is not 
introduced by the subject, but already “exists prior to each subject’s 
entry into it at a certain moment in his mental development.”30 The 
implications of this insight for an understanding of the notion of the 
subject (as well as the resulting consequences concerning ontological 
as well as ethical questions) will be dealt with in the following 
chapters. For now, we shall be preserve what – according to this 
insight – demonstrates that it is not enough to say that the subject is a 
slave of language; that she has to make use of language in order to re-
present the world. She is subject to the “signifying chain,” to a 
discourse which exists prior to her, to a place already inscribed at her 
birth.31 This discourse - and here Lacan and Derrida are very much in 
                                                           
26
 Derrida, Jacques: Sec: “’Ritual’ is not a possible occurance [éventualité], but rather, 
as iterability, a structural characteristic of every mark.” p.15. 
27
 Ibid, p.14. 
28
 Lacan, Jacques: The Instance of the Letter, p.418. For Derrida’s account of the notion 
of writing and trace cf. for example: Derrida, Jacques: Of Grammatology. Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins Univ. Press 1998. 
29
 Ibid, p.415. 
30
 Ibid, p.413. 
31
 Ibid. p.414.  
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agreement - revolves around nothing, “for experience takes on its 
essential dimension in the tradition established by this discourse”.32  
Let us leave aside questions on the origin and substance of the subject 
for later inquiries (see Chapter 2 and 3) and turn our attention to the 
links of this chain Lacan and Derrida refer to as the primary motor of 
human relations. Derrida accuses Austin of missing the central aspect 
of language by overhastily dismissing “quoted” utterances, citations. 
For, if a performative utterance is to succeed, it has to draw back on 
an established meaning, or code: 
“Could a performative utterance succeed if its formulation 
did not repeat a “coded” or iterable utterance, or in other 
words, if the formula I pronounce in order to open a 
meeting, launch a ship or a marriage were not identifiable 
as conforming with an iterable model, if it were not then 
identifiable in some way as a ‘citation’?”33 
In this respect, the signifying chain constitutes itself by virtue of the 
possibility of repetition, of iterability, of the performative as such and 
language in general (in fact there is no language which is not 
performative or, as Derrida puts it, graphemic in its essence). That is 
to say, only because the unity between the signifier and its referent is 
broken34, only because there is a primordial lack of the Ding35, can 
                                                           
32
 Ibid. By recognizing ourselves at a distinct place in the symbolic system, the structure 
of the field of language, we enter structures which “display an ordering of exchanges 
which, even if unconscious, is inconceivable apart from the permutations authorized by 
language.” (Ibid.) In other words, entering the symbolic order may be conceived, when 
speaking with Marx, as the “first historical act”. Cf. Marx, Karl: The German 
Ideology.http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/german-
ideology/ch01a.htm. Lacan’s allusion to historic materialism is, I believe, intended, but 
he does not go into further details concerning this topic (“I shall neither take sides here 
nor take this as a point of departure, leaving to their own obscurity the original relations 
between the signifier and labour.”) – at least not in this essay. 
33
 Derrida, Jacques: Sec, p.18. 
34
 Or ‘barred’ as Lacan calls it – the ‘barre’ being the line separating signifier from 
signified in the Lacanian diagrams. It is also, as we shall see, what separates the subject 
from herself ($). 
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language as well as the world of things arise. This lack, or “nonpresent 
remainder [restance] of a differential mark cut off from its putative 
“production” or origin,”36 is the condition of possibility of any form of 
“experience”. What had been excluded by Austin as a parasitic 
exception is in fact the very structure of language as such. Without 
this force of negativity, change would be impossible, signifier and 
signified would be glued together in a radically immediate and self-
present way and the symbolic system – which is the condition of any 
form of historicity – would break down. We would live like 
Nietzsche’s animals, tied to fundamental immediacy.37  
We  do not suffer “death as presence”38 because we are born under the 
law of the signifier which deprives us of the Ding and thus of 
presence, puts us into a status of the living dead and brings us to life 
as the condition of possibility of any form of history or experience. 
Without our submission under the dead letter there would be no 
possibility of experience of life as such.39 This is why Derrida refers 
to différance (the differential play in the writing forth of the chain of 
signifiers) as the site of the production of an “economy of death”40. In 
other words, only through a lack of Being can humans come into 
being through the labor of the letter. Taking this into consideration, 
Austin’s distinction between ‘proper’ and ‘parasitic’ performatives, 
                                                                                                                                                                          
35
 Cf. Lacan, Jacques: The Ethics of Psychoanalysis. The Seminar of Jacques Lacan. 
Book VII. London, New York: Routledge 2008. 
36
 Ibid, p.10. 
37
 Nietzsche, Friedrich: Vom Nutzen und Nachteil der Historie für das Leben. Stuttgart: 
Reclam 1999. 
38
 In this respect, Lacan teaches us that „the letter kills while the spirit gives life“ – 
Lacan: The Instance of the Letter in the Unconscious, p.508. 
39
 For more on the evental nature of the dead letter cf.: Zeillinger, Peter: Das Ereignis 
als Symptom. Annährung an einen entscheidenden Horizont des Denkens. In: 
Zeillinger, Peter and Dominik Portune (ed.): nach Derrida. Dekonstruktion in 
zeitgenössischen Diskussionen. Wien: Turia+Kant 2006. pp.173-199. Here: 175. 
40
 Derrida, Jaques: Différance. In: Culler, Jonathan (Ed.): Deconstruction. Critical 
Concepts in Literary and Cultural Studies. Vol.I. London, New York: Routledge 2003. 
pp.141-166. Here: 142.  
20 
 
between those which are uttered ‘under normal circumstances’ and 
those which shall not be taken into consideration because they are 
citations, quoted and repeated expressions, cannot be upheld. Austin 
draws our attention to the fact that performatives present themselves 
to us in disguise, but fails to see that the masquerade of language is 
that it appears as a sign of immediacy, of singularity, despite its 
necessary inability to attain meaning in this singularity. There is no 
autonomy of one signifier, there is only the differential play of a 
signifying chain – there is only différance.41  
 In order to illustrate this lack of a finite, re-presentable anchor point, 
Lacan supplements the Saussurian illustration of signifier over 
signified with the following: 
 
The claim here is not so much to score an easy point by determinating 
that the signified is already preclosed, that the Ding an sich can never 
be grasped as such but only in mediation in and through language. The 
point is, instead, that the signifier itself enters the signified and thus 
“raises the question of its place in reality.”42 In other words, there is 
no materiality prior to the signifier – the signifier itself is a material 
fabric, a grapheme (Derrida) or letter (Lacan). The signified is 
constantly sliding under the signifier; Derrida’s dictum that “the mark 
is invalid outside of a context, but on the contrary that there are only 
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contexts without any center or absolute anchoring [ancrage]”43 must 
be understood in this very precise sense: 
 
S’, S’’, S’’’ …/meaning 
 
This leads Lacan to claim that the signifying function proper can only 
be understood in its consonance with the laws of metonymy and its 
word-to-word nature. But for meaning to arise a secondary process is 
needed in order to cause the necessary “poetic spark” for “creation to 
occur.”44 We have underscored the way in which the metonymic chain 
is marked by an irreducible lack (of Being), in which one signifier 
stands next to another and pushes the other towards filling the lack it 
supports, a task it can never manage to complete – it can only write 
itself along, but it cannot create. For creation to happen, for the new to 
occur, something else is needed. This ‘something else’ is the 
productive force of metaphor. Metaphor substitutes one signifier for 
another and is thus able to suture the lack at the same time as it 
produces something new (a surplus value).45 
This structural formalization of the performative nature of language 
must be read as serving – at the same time – as an account of the 
Freudian notion of the unconscious. This coincidence is due to 
Lacan’s continuation of the Copernican revolution begun by Freud, 
wherein the insight that there is something which thinks where I am 
not thinking, is supplemented by the claim that this ‘something’ is 
structured like a language, thus rendering problematic the pre-given 
assumption that language is a mere means of communication. The 
                                                           
43
 Derrida, Jacques: Sec, p.12. 
44
 Lacan, Jacques: Instance of the Letter, p.421-422. 
45
 Ibid, 428-429. 
22 
 
metonymic/metaphoric chain is not something the subject has at hand 
in order to express her thoughts; this quality of language is the actual 
birthplace of the subject.  
Derrida –and it is at this precise point that we must mark out a 
different path – dismisses this notion of the subject, for he is more 
interested in the graphemic notion of writing as such and the ways in 
which the re-production and the re-signation of a statement may 
produce the new.46 His focus is on the text (the textum as a woven 
fabric of letters, or graphemes, which is the garment of our being and 
experience)47, on notions of experience, autonomy (there is no 
autonomous act in the process of re-signation), and the event, the à 
venir. In Derrida’s understanding of the signifier, the signifying chain 
will always be in process, a constant unfolding of the event which can 
never be fully realized. In this respect, he is much closer to what 
might be called a superficial understanding of Lacan’s notion of the 
letter – an understanding that accords with Derrida’s own conception. 
It was only recently that Michel Lewis pointed out that although 
Derrida often railed against the tri-partition of Imaginary, Symbolic, 
and Real, there is a distinct proximity to Lacan in Derrida’s own 
thinking. And yet, as Lewis points out, there is a fundamental 
difference which seperates these two thinkers. While Lacan introduces 
three registers of being, Derrida seems to focus most of his attention 
on only two of them – the symbolic and the real.48 According to 
Lewis, Derrida’s assumes that in order for the new to unfold (the 
event to be enacted) we must alter our understanding of the present 
state of the situation we are thrown into. And this, in a subsequent 
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turn, must alter the way in which we then extract ourselves from this 
very state. In other words, we have to know what we are abstracting 
ourselves from before we can go ahead and do it.49 Derrida thus 
misses the imaginary side of the signifier as it has been accounted for 
by Lacan and others.50 This side comprises a writing as trace found at 
the basis of language and constituting an “indivisible imaginary unity, 
which amounts to the pre-symbolic real as it is preserved in the 
symbol”51.  The emphasis Derrida puts on the Real and the Symbolic 
aspect of the signifier seems to suggest a greater interest in the 
metonymical, rather than in the metaphoric, process. In Derrida’s 
account of performativity, continuity is thus of greater importance 
than questions of rupture, that radical rearrangement of the given 
order by the creative spark of metaphor. Following Lacan in this 
respect, I will argue that a proper understanding of both the 
ontological and ethical foundation of our being both is needed – a 
theory of the signifying chain (as an interrelation of metonymic and 
metaphoric processes), as well as the introduction of the subject into 
this field as the vanishing mediator that sutures Real, Symbolic, and 
Imaginary, or Being and Event. 
What does it mean to say that we must come to terms with the 
concepts of Being and Event? In order to approach this question – and 
determine the connections to both Lacan and Derrida that will proceed 
from this approach – let us turn to another French thinker who 
distances himself from Lacanian psychoanalysis, while remaining 
uncannily linked to it. In sharp contrast to Derrida, Alain Badiou 
places the notion of the subject at the center of his philosophic 
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inquiries as this which sutures this minimal gap between Being and 
Event. 
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2.2. A Subject of Truth 
In this investigation into the potentials and limits of what I call the 
political body of the collective, a body which requires a performative 
understanding of the political (insofar as it is subject to the 
performative notions of repetition, resignation, and resignification), 
questions of subjectivity cannot and shall not be dismissed. Focusing 
on Lacan’s logic of the signifier as the metonymic-metaphoric writing 
forth of a ‘meaningful trace’ (a trace which is itself the condition of 
possibility of any form of meaning to arise), we saw that, in his re-
reading of Austin’s notion of the performative, Derrida seems to give 
high priority to the materiality of this signifying chain as trace – a 
priority that marks a distance from the metaphoric process of quilting 
delineated by Lacan. This overemphasis of the metonymic chain over 
the radical unity of metaphorical quilting leads Derrida to several 
assumptions which might be (and in this inquiry shall be) regarded as 
problematic. The first, as has already been mentioned, is that the 
notion of the subject is no longer necessary for Derrida. Quite the 
contrary – it is regarded as a form of false consciousness, a delusion of 
unity, of a One which sublates the lives of individuals within a 
realized community. For Derrida, this One does not exist. But – and 
this is also where he not only breaks with Lacan, but also positions 
himself in sharp contrast to the Badiouian theory of b/Being – this 
subject is also not seen as a necessary impossibility – a supposed 
Other who retroactively will always have been. The Derridian 
emphasis on the metonymic process of writing seems to imply (at 
least to me) the utopian belief that a writing without a radical 
intervention, without the production of a unified One, could be 
possible – a free play of diffèrance where each speech act holds the 
potential to fundamentally change the state of the situation (‘there are 
only contexts without anchor’), where each speech act is a possible 
event, all we have to do is to act upon it. For Derrida, the event can be 
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first of all grasped as an irritation, something like an anamorphotic 
stain which interrupts the steady and seamless flow of the signifying 
chain. Its performative character results from a staging of attempts of 
ontological filling of diffèrance as a place holder, a re-signification 
(i.e. the production of new meaning) through the re-signation (i.e. the 
transformation of the signifiers’ meaning under the labor of re-
inscribing its constitutive diffèrance within it). In this way, the event 
urges us to put it into action (to introduce it into the scene). And 
because the event manages to speak to us/speak us as diffèrance, it not 
only has to be read as an evental experience, but – as an evental 
experience – cannot not be understood as such, as it interrupts the 
innocent slumber of the status quo.52 
But the following question presents itself: is the event – as conceived 
by Derrida – ‘strong enough’ to liberate us from the chains of the state 
of the situation, from the tyranny of the dead letter under which we 
have come into being in the form of half being, as the collective body 
of the living dead. That is to say, is the event – as it is understood by 
Derrida – in a position to radically transform this situation; or, in 
Lacanese, is this event in any way related to the psychoanalytic act of 
traversing the fantasy, whereby the individuals’ entire economy of 
desire is reconfigured; or does this understanding (of Derrida’s) run 
the risk of remaining within the law’s immanent excess in the form of 
an irritation, of a carnevalesque reversal of values, as the constitutive 
other (the unconscious in the form of irritating yet pleasurable 
symptoms, never to be transformed into sinthomes)?53 Instead of 
theorizing an event that would function as a form of radical 
intervention and rupture, Derrida relies  on an idea of the evental act 
as a continuous play of perhaps and promise (a Ver-sprechen, the 
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form of differential speech that has been illustrated above), a steady à 
venir of justice to come.54 
But isn’t this assumption uncannily close to the postmodern tales told 
to us by people like Habermas or Rorty, in which we are told to hold 
onto a strict ‘no no’ to terrorism and a ‘yes, yes’ to promise, to a form 
of speech that will find the ‘right idiom’ and the ‘right setting’ so that 
everyone will have the chance to subversively transform the cultural 
signs of society and produce a realized utopia, a juster place,55 a 
resignative ‘anything goes but nothing ever comes’? Even more so, 
the excessive (or subversive) disruption of the (symbolic) law’s 
barriers often only leads to this barriers’ becoming even more rigid. 
Metonymical acts of ‘one-word-for-another’ are very much in the 
position to change the law within a given order, but they cannot touch 
the conditions formative for the existence of that very law, they cannot 
change the coordinates for being as such.  
For this to happen, a different understanding of the event is needed, an 
event which is not, in fact, separable from the act through which it is 
carried out. This act is precisely the act of naming as such, of giving a 
name to what, from the standpoint of the situation, is not only unlikely 
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but appears as an impossibility, an evental naming in whose aftermath 
this naming will appear to have always been not only possible but 
absolutely indispensable.56 This happens when the metonymic chain 
of ‘one-to-another’ is sutured by the force of metaphoric intervention 
of “one-for-another.’ 
This radical intervention as a fundamental re-structuring of the 
system’s coordinates has been given no greater importance than in the 
work of Alain Badiou. For Badiou, the event is no longer separable 
from the act of naming it. And it is this revolutionary intervention of a 
breach with the symbolic system, the ‘state of the situation,’57 which 
requires the notion of a subject. For, in contrast to Derrida’s belief that 
there are ‘only contexts without anchoring,’ Badiou asserts (with 
Lacan) that any given order has to be structured around a formative 
absence, something which belongs to the state of the situation but 
(within this situation) is not counted (or does not count). It is a 
“supernumary”58 element which is represented but somehow not 
present in the situation. Derrida is, of course, correct to posit the 
event’s unpredictability, but accounts for this undecideability in a 
wholly inadequate way; it is not unpredictable because ‘it might or 
might not happen,’ but because it is simply not thinkable within the 
status quo. It is, instead, that which is excluded from the rule of 
thought but gives rise to the very possibility of thought, to the 
emergence of reason as such. It is only retroactively, only in the 
aftermath of the event, that it will always have been an event. 
While Badiou – and in this respect he is actually quite close the 
Derridian concept of negativity qua diffèrance – claims that the event 
is a nothing, a simple inexistence prior to the act of naming, a 
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fundamental anchor of reality’s constitutive negativity (this 
différance) as a constitutive absence, he does not accept the Derridian 
dictum of the necessity of an openness towards the event (which might 
then hit us from time to time … or it might not, we cannot tell). While 
the event (in Badiou) is not graspable as such, there is something 
related to it and which can be logically deduced from the state of a 
situation. Badiou calls this the “evental site”. This evental site is, as 
Peter Hallward points out, “an element of a situation that, as inspected 
from a perspective within the situation, has no recognizable elements 
or qualities of its own (no elements in common with the situation).59 
These elements belong to the given state of the situation only through 
their non-belonging. They are re-presented as a group but lack all 
individualizing properties. For the group, they function as the 
(imagined or imaginary)60 o/Other, the one belonging in not-belonging 
that renders it possible for the other elements of the situation to 
position themselves as the (positively given) One against an 
(imagined, or supposed) Other. Linking this back to Lacanian 
terminology, it becomes clear that the site of the event can be related 
to the notion of the symptom. As as is the case with the site of the 
event, the symptom too represents something which clearly belongs to 
the individual but always remains uncannily foreign to her. It is the 
manifestation of a discourse which resists submission under the rule of 
thought – the unconscious. It is the embodiment of a constitutive 
emptiness, the remainder of an absence of and distance towards Being 
which is the condition of possibility for being (as individuality) to 
arise. In this sense, Badiou inserts – between the state of the situation 
(the symbolic order) and the differential mark which renders visible 
the impossibility and incompletability of such an order (i.e. diffèrance 
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as the real of discourse) – a third term in form of the evental site, i.e. 
the symptomal, re-presentation of the impossibility of the unity of this 
state of the situation, a state necessarily barred.61 The symptomal 
element that the evental site itself represents is thus the very 
foundation of the state of the situation where it is not presented:62 
“there is nothing in or ‘beneath’ such an element that might tie it to 
the rest of the situation, no trail of belongings or roots that might 
determine its proper place in the situation.”63 It is embodied 
diffèrance. 
Like Derrida’s theory, Badiou’s interventions focus on the 
fundamental question of how it is possible to think the inauguration of 
the new as something which is implicitly given/known within this 
situation and not coming from somewhere else (from a place ‘outside’ 
of the given order – for both are well aware that outside the law of the 
symbolic there is only death as presence waiting for us). Derrida’s 
merit is to have delineated that this ‘Other’ is itself present in the 
signifier; it is, in fact, the constituting element which bars any 
signifier, thus making it subject to iterability and, as such, an element 
within the metonymic chain of meaning. In addition to this, Badiou 
points out that this differential mark is a very visible one re-presented 
through the ‘othering’ of certain elements within a community. 
These elements, the evental site – and this is why Badiou’s 
intervention cannot be overestimated – are also the place for the 
production of truth. What is it that can be known of a truth? Let us, for 
now, follow Badiou’s explications of this term; afterwards, we will 
return to Lacan and his notion of truth as something, that – like the 
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subject (the relation is by no means arbitrary) – can never fully exist, 
that functions in the form of being “said by halves”64. For Badiou, 
truths exist and are embodied by the site of the event, that 
supernumary element in the form of an Umbilical (i.e. symptomal) 
knot. But what is needed for change to be realized – for the 
potentiality sublated in this element to be actualized in the form of a 
new law is – here we are – a subject. A subject which does not exist 
prior to her involvement in constructing a truth “from the void”65 as is 
being re-presented in the supernumary element. The intervention of an 
individual who subtracts herself from the given state of the situation 
by affirming the truth value of the symptomal knot (the evental site) of 
the situation’s constitution, this ‘fidelity’ to the disavowed cause of 
desire is what Badiou refers to as a “truth procedure”66. It is a process 
in which the subject subjects herself to a new cause which is being 
affirmed as ‘what really counts,’ this one thing (the evental elements) 
that ‘really matters.’  
For Badiou, the notion of the subject is equivalent to the signifier of 
breach. Subjectivity arises through the fidelity to the event, through 
the affirmation of what is of the situation but does not have a part (a 
share) in that very situation. To illustrate this point, Badiou repeatedly 
calls to mind two major events in western history: the Paul-event and 
the French Revolution.67 The founding gesture of Paulinian 
Christianity is the affirmation of a radically new law erupting under 
the fundamental singularity of a personal experience that, at the same 
time, bears the potential of giving body to the (disavowed) void within 
the situation from which it takes its leave. This (Paulinian) law must 
not be regarded as an amendment to the existing one, a gradual 
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improvement of the latter; it is, instead, the absolute reconfiguration of 
all the elements present in this situation. Paul addresses this void 
through his dictum “there is neither Jew nor Greek, there is neither 
slave nor free, there is neither male nor female,”68 thus inscribing the 
immanent exclusion into the order of being again (and, by this, 
transforming the conditions of being itself).  
The act of naming, giving a name to this exclusion, to the body of the 
living dead is the event proper (the rise of a new truth), as well as it 
has to be regarded as the birth of the subject. Or rather, the paradox 
involved in this conceptualization is that in order to name this event, a 
subject (of speech) will be needed to carry out this operation, yet this 
very subject is what is only constituted après-coup, through the act of 
naming. We are thus dealing here with a form of founding 
retroactivity, of the event as well as the subject (two categories which 
are, as we shall see, not separable from each other). The subject is 
‘interpellated’ by the Other (as void), which is the cause for her 
inauguration as a subject. In this respect, the notion of ‘interpellation’ 
is by no means a random one, and it is Slavoj Žižek’s virtue for 
having pointed out the underlying relation between Badiou’s event of 
truth and Louis Althusser’s notion of ‘ideological interpellation.’ 
Badiou’s strict opposition of knowledge (the positive knowledge 
within the order of being, or, positivism proper) and truth (as being of 
the order of the void and thus to be situated in the register of Being, 
with capital B) seems uncannily close to Althusser’s dichotomy of 
science and ideology.69 Yet, there is a fundamental difference within 
the conceptualization of subjectivity at the heart of the two thinkers’ 
accounts. While Althusser locates subjectivity within the state of the 
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situation (within the rule of the Other), the Badiouian subject is the 
very breach with this situation. 
Badiou’s claim that events, like subjects, are rare need not, therefore, 
to puzzle us. A subject is she (the ‘militant,’ as Badiou calls her) who 
breaks with the established conditions of the given order by 
pronouncing this founding negativity (in the form of a first founding 
violence) that is the very condition of any form of (positively 
sublated) being within this order. The rest, the ones who do not engage 
themselves in this procedure of pronouncing (and thus producing) a 
new truth remain stuck in a state of the living dead or, as Badiou 
refers to this state of life – in a form of ‘animal humanism.’ According 
to Badiou, there are four fields in which this militant intervention can 
be carried out: love, science, art, and politics. The essays presented in 
the second part of this examination will deal with these categories in 
closer detail. Chapter 3 will focus on a concept of subjectivity and 
subjectivation in relation to the o/Other, supplementing what has been 
established so far with an analysis that argues for the necessity of 
incorporating a (negative) dialectics of recognition into the theory of 
the subject. Chapter 4 focuses on the limits as well as potentials of the 
‘work of art’ as a form of militant intervention; and Chapter 5 
examines the notion of the political body in further detail. As noted 
above, there will be no single chapter on the notion of love, for love is 
literally everywhere insofar as it is that which is needed to change 
discourse70, a necessary constituent of every truth procedure. 
Let us return once more to the notion of the subject. How is this 
Badiouian subject to be taken in relation to the Derridan notion of the 
death of the subject? Of paramount importance here are the notions of 
decision and a break with the established state of the situation (in 
other words, the subtraction from the tyranny of the letter). To briefly 
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recapitulate: within the state of a situation, within a universal order of 
being, there are certain elements which are excluded from this very 
order; or rather, are only included through their exclusion (“the part of 
no part”). These elements bear a distinct relation to the void (Ø) of the 
situation in the form of the evental site (the ‘edge of the void’ as 
Badiou also refers to them). In pronouncing this symptomal site as the 
situation’s truth, the concrete seizes the place of the universal and thus 
reconfigures the very conditions of being as such. 
It could thus be argued that the subject as vanishing mediator is again 
– as an effect of discourse – the very evental site it pronounces as the 
situation’s truth. In other words: 
$ = Evental Site 
It seems, however, that Badiou does not in fact draw the above 
conclusion, owing (perhaps) to his overemphasis of the other side of 
the metonymico-metaphaphorical process – his, appraisal of the 
metaphoric event of the suturing of the situation and thus the 
production of the One. The Žižekian critique of Badiou’s account of 
subjectivity finds its origin at this precise point. For, what cannot be 
accounted for in a theory of the subject which does not take into 
consideration the subject as evental site is precisely the too-much (the 
excess, jouissance) this very subject presents as a whole (a void), an 
entity which exceeds the range of meaning, a signifier that cannot be 
substituted for another, but is rather placed (next) to another without 
any sense (a non-sensical signifier) – the intrusion of metnonymy 
within metaphor, destabilizing as well as conditioning the latter. It is 
in this sense that Žižek’s criticism that Badiou fails to inscribe the 
Freudian notion of defense into his account of subjectivity and 
subjectivation should be understood. 
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Like Derrida, Badiou claims that “the One is not”71. But this does not 
mean that we have to regard being as an infinitely complex state 
without any “point of anchoring” and thus affirm (A) the end of the 
subject and subjectivity and (B) the claim that we have to reach a state 
of the free play of the signifying chain, of diffèrance (after the end of 
imaginary, i.e. ideological representation). Quite the opposite is the 
case. The One, a form of imaginary unity is what is indispensable – if 
also inexistent – to the human being as such. In his early essay “The 
Mirror Stage as Formative of the I Function as Revealed in 
Psychoanalytic Experience”72, Lacan acknowledges the importance of 
the imaginary function, a function that enables the little child to 
perceive herself as an individual (a singularly functioning unity) 
through an image (reflected back to her through the mirror) and which 
re-presents something that does not exist (at that moment in her 
physical development, the little child does not have full command 
over her body, a body which is not yet her body but rather a partial 
objects, a multiplicity of partial objects, an inconsistency). Through 
the imaginary production of a coherent picture of her body, through 
the register of the imaginary, the body of the little child is produced as 
an individual body for her. 
The process at work here illustrates once again the interrelation of 
metonymy and metaphor as noted above in Chapter 1. The signifying 
chain, the metonymic work of putting into action one signifier for 
another, has to be regarded as incomplete without its other side, the 
metaphoric quilting of this chain; or, in Badiou’s words, the counting 
of the elements present in an inconsistent set in order to achieve a 
state (of a situation), an imaginary re-presentation of these elements 
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36 
 
within a community supposed as One.73 To affirm the presence of the 
One is the founding gesture of Badiouian thought. 
It is in this respect that Badiou’s resentment of deconstruction must be 
understood. Where deconstruction tries to draw our attention to a 
multiplicity of meanings without ‘any anchoring’ (through the 
negative diffèrance as the condition of possibility of every sign or 
mark to appear), which have to be continuously performed and re-
signed – in the form of a signature, the seal we attach onto every 
speech act once we utter/perform it; in other words, where 
deconstruction emphasizes all the different shades of the production of 
a signifying chain in its metonymic aspects, Badiou rigorously 
dismisses these insights as postmodern banalities. What he demands 
of philosophic thought is not a conceptualization of all the 
multiplicities of meaning but the answer to the question of how all 
these different meanings, this particular re-presentation, can be 
transformed into a universal One and thus become meaningful. For, 
while it is true that ‘the woman’ does not exist (there are only white 
women, black women, single mothers, middle class women etc.) this 
insight is not what should preoccupy our philosophical inquiries. The 
true philosophical question is how we can pass from this multiplicity 
of particularities (the little child’s partial objects, the individual’s 
fragmented body) to a unity of imaginary representation as it is 
proposed in Lacan’s matheme of the fundamental phantasy: $<>a74? 
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 In Being and Event, Badiou has more to say on the topic of counting. We would have 
to provide a slight shift in focus – away from Badiou - concerning the nature of the 
count in order to replace Badiou’s tendency to overestimate the notion of rupture in 
subjectivation with a more balanced model which will take into account the two sides of 
subjectivation according to Lacan. In other words, Chapter 2.1. proposed an 
understanding of the count which does not only break with the established context (the 
state of the situation) but sublates this count again in a dialectics of recognition. 
74
 The matheme of the fundamental fantasy as introduced by Lacan can also be read as 
an indication that every universal order has to be sustained by a particular (negative) 
element (objet a) which is only part of this universal through its not taking part in that 
very order. 
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Žižek relates these two understandings of infinite multiplicity to the 
two forms of infinity as presented in Hegel’s philosophy: the first, a 
‘bad infinity’75, would relate to the common sense notion of infinity in 
which ‘the modern world is too complex for us to fully understand it 
any longer;’ the second, a truthful infinity, comes to terms with the 
infinity of an event and thus manages to transcend the ‘infinite 
complexity’ of its immediate context.76 According to Badiou – and 
this is where he radically differs from Derrida and other 
deconstructive thinkers –, the event is not a performative game of de- 
and re-contextualization; it is, instead, that which conditions the 
possibility of any form of ‘contextuality’ as such. 
The true performative act is the one where the actor passes through 
the founding negativity (diffèrance) by affirming the state (of a 
situation)’s immanent exclusion, giving it a name and thus re-
inscribing it,  thereby altering the conditions of this very state. This 
‘actor’ is the truth of the Badiouian subject – an effect of naming the 
unnamable, the production of a new law, the realization of an 
imminent utopia. She re-signs from the state of the situation, subtracts 
herself from the law of the dead letter and thus falls out of the 
condition of ‘animal humanism’ in order to be ‘born again,’ 
resurrected under the new law of the event which she pronounces and 
which, retroactively, will have inaugurated her. From the point of 
view of the established order, this subject cannot but appear as a 
terrorist threat (threatening to strike deep into that which conditions 
the order); it is only retroactively, from the viewpoint of the ‘new 
law,’ that she will always have been an heroic subject, carrying out a 
fundamentally necessary act. 
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But what Badiou fails to take into consideration is that the subject of 
breach (or rupture) is only one half of the subject. The metaphoric 
spark of rupture which sutures the metonymic chain would not be 
sustainable without the writing forth of this very chain. Thus, the 
other side of the subject (as distinct from its radical metaphorical 
intervention) is the subject of the metonymic chain – a subject who 
has “the relation of one signifier to another”77. This relational function 
is what constitutes the subject for Lacan’s understanding in the first 
place:  
“And from this there results the emergence of what we call 
the subject – via the signifier which, as it happens, here 
functions as representing this subject with respect to 
another signifier.”78 
The subject is both that which is “divided between (conscious) 
obedience to the Law and (unconscious) desire for its transgression.”79 
A hidden assumption of the Badiouian account of subjectivity seems 
to be his (utopian) belief in a subject capable of leaving her state of 
‘animal humanism’ behind, a subject positively realizing herself in the 
reign of life (as opposed to the symbolic death of alienation –what is, 
through the law, the nom du père – what alienates us from Being 
itself) through her fidelity to the truth event. The act of subjectivation, 
however, is doubled: it is the radical act of decision which suspends 
the subject from the order of being, from the order of ideological 
closure and throws it into a state of ‘transcendental homelessness’80 as 
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well as it is the process whereby one signifier is re-presented for 
another signifier. The difficulty we have to come to terms with in 
designing a theory of the subject is the following: to figure a subject 
that is neither a static nor a positive category, but a dynamic and 
negative function of our very being. Thus, the subject cannot be 
grasped as a function of rupture alone, punctuating the order of being 
by giving a name to its imminent excess and tearing it apart through 
her fidelity to a truth procedure, i.e. the metaphoric process of 
quilting. She is also the embodied paradox of a particular element who 
herself sustains the universal order of a law by re-presenting her 
knowledge for an Other. 
And even more so, the process of subjectivation should not be 
understood as teleological, whereby we affirm an event, appear as 
subjects … and that’s the end of the story. The status of the subject is 
a precarious one and cannot be sustained for very long because its 
function is that of a vanishing mediator suturing the old (law) with the 
new (law).81 In other words, what we are dealing with is the Freudian 
notion of the death drive (a category Badiou dismisses vehemently)82 
as the founding drive of subjectivity. From this point of contention, 
two insights can be extracted: firstly, the act of naming the event is not 
to be mistaken with the production of a positively given subject but 
must be grasped, instead, as the production of a gap, the production of 
a subject between two deaths83; secondly, the subject of this gap can 
also be accomplished through an act that has a purely negative gesture 
(the Bartlebyan ‘I would prefer not to’), a form of radical subtraction 
from the state of the situation.  
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While Derrida overestimates the power of the metonymic chain, 
Badiou performs the opposing mistake and overestimates the 
metaphorical process. For a proper understanding of subjectivity and 
subjectivation, both are necessary, as interpenetrating processes that 
cannot be so easily prioritized (as Derrida and Badiou would have us 
believe). Just as the one-for-another of metonymy cannot be 
understood via the suturing carried out by metaphoric counting 
(through a constitutive negativity), so too is this counting impossible 
without countable elements (sliding under the primacy One signifier). 
A third term is needed, something which is to be found at the very 
limit of and the passage from void to One. It is this third term that the 
following chapter will focus on. 
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3. Love will tear us apart: On Ø, 0 and 1 … and the fatal 
Attractions of Destruction84 
All is fair in love and war. If we want to speak about bodies, about the 
notion of the subject, and, after all, about the political body of such a 
subject, we will also have to talk about how this body is constituted 
for an o/Other, in relation to this O/one we call our o/Other – be this 
very o/Other our friend or the person we despise the most, our 
enemy85, be this in love or war. In the first part of this work, I 
delineated the structural properties of subjectivity as they were 
introduced into the field of psychoanalytic inquiry by Jacques Lacan 
(through his attention to language as a symbolic system existing prior 
to and determining the subject in general and the functions of the 
metonymic/metaphoric process in particular). 
I have sought to point out that both Jacques Derrida and Alain Badiou 
appear to remain uncannily close to this concept of subjectivity – no 
matter what they explicitly state concerning their relationship to 
Jacques Lacan (we know that defense mechanisms often force us to 
disavow what we are drawn to the most). While Derrida focuses on 
the metonymic process (the notion of the trace), Badiou seems more 
interested in the metaphoric act of quilting, of introducing a new 
master signifier into the reign of the dead letter, i.e. a old law. Because 
of this metonymic priority, Derrida dismisses the notion of the subject 
as a form of false consciousness which is to be avoided at all costs so 
as to make way for a subversive negativity at the foundation of our 
very being. By contrast, Badiou’s central category is this very subject. 
Or, to reformulate this thesis differently, we might say that Derrida 
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relies on the necessary absence, the void (Ø)86 (which is the one-word-
to-another, the absolute heterogeneous, the ineffable) whereas 
Badiou’s interest clearly revolves around the concept of the One. 
According to the latter, subjectivity is an effect of truth, of a truth 
procedure whereby the subject holds on to her idée fixe, a certain 
thought or cause which is represented within the situation but is not 
yet present (an empty category).87 Through this act of love towards 
that which cannot be said (because there are no words within the 
symbolic law which could re-present it), the subject re-inscribes the 
constitutive exclusion within the state of the situation, producing a 
new law at the same time as she inaugurates herself as a subject of this 
situation. The paradoxical fact that the subject is both cause and effect 
of this truth procedure is clear to Badiou; it is the same paradox as 
described by Hegel’s concrete absolute. It is, in fact, the very same 
impasse that Lacan’s subject has to face up to. But because Badiou 
conceives subjectivity as a (largely) positive category and attributes 
such fundamental importance to the force of the One, he is unable to 
properly account for and treat this paradox. In the movement from 
bare life to the positively given subject of the new law – from void to 
One – a gap in Badiou’s theory becomes legibile. In order to further 
explain this we shall, once again, draw on Lacan’s account of 
subjectivity by proposing the notion of the subject as a vanishing 
mediator – the zero point of focalization between old and new. Or, in 
other words, what I shall argue for is the re-introduction of a 
(negative) dialectics of recognition into the process of subjectivation.  
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To speak about recognition is to necessarily always already speak 
about the o/Other, about someone else (someone special) who has to 
see us, recognize us and thus put us back together (back again, but for 
the first time) into ourselves, recognizing our body and thus producing 
it. Psychoanalysis has gone a long way in explaining the importance 
of the o/Other for the inauguration of the self. There is good reason to 
talk about love when talking about subjectivation through and in the 
o/Other, for is it not the love of our mothers (or, to be precise, of the 
maternal function) that is required for the materialization of our bodily 
trace. 
The process of subjectivation requires the introduction of a double 
loss: we have to let go of the symbiotic unity with the o/Other 
(alienation) and – as though that loss were not dear enough – learn 
that this Other itself does not exist (separation); or, to put it another 
way, this Other exists but we will never be enough to fill in its 
(his/her) lack. The child cannot be the mother’s phallus because she 
wants something else, because she desires an o/Other for herself, 
because she longs for another law – the nom-du-père, the symbolic, 
i.e. language. Instead of saying that Badiou favors metaphor over 
metonymy, we could also say that he lets his subject go through 
separation (a new symbolic law, a new father, a new One) without 
having first passed through alienation. 
But before we can be put together again under the reign of a new law, 
we have to be torn apart – this is what love does to us, this is what we 
do through the act of loving. Love – and this love is not that of 
Aristophane’s One – first puts us into a state of absolute 
transcendental homelessness, shatters us entirely. Many songs have 
been sung about this fact – needless to say, love is first of all a form of 
violence. 
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In this chapter, we will treat both, love and war – harmony and 
violence; that which puts us back together and tears us apart again, 
what sets us asunder, troubles us and holds the power to disintegrate 
us to a state where we can no longer even be sure what this word ‘us,’ 
this ‘I’ as opposed to an other, this ‘you’ even means. And everyone 
who has ever had the dubious pleasure of experiencing this psychotic 
feeling88 called love will probably understand that it is both. What we 
are dealing with here are two sides of the same coin really, the radical 
act of loving someone is in a way always already war, or – as Slavoj 
Žižek argues – it’s the true state of exception (Ausnahmezustand)89. 
The first act of love is not that which unites us with our other half (in a 
Platonic sense)90; it is not the goal we reach … in the end … finally, 
after an exhausting journey roaming through the world searching for 
“our better half.” Quite the contrary, instead of singing us a sweet 
lullaby before we let go and go to sleep, pacified and happy ever after, 
love is the force which first of all will tear us apart, which evicts us 
from our ordinary order of being, our mere being under the steady 
continuum of time and history, leaving us alone in our state 
transcendental homelessness. Driving us out of our cozy and velvety 
“Etuis”91, it is this moment of utmost danger which radically forces us 
into the act of decision – yes or no (no more tick-boxes for maybes as 
elementary school days are definitely over). 
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Only in a second step – (which is not to be thought of within the linear 
time continuum, but grasped in the form of the Lacan’s Borromean 
knot92) – and only if this act is picked up by the o/Other, if we are 
loved back, will we be put back together –the same yet different, in a 
world which is still the same, yet altered. This violent rupture within 
the ordinary order of being, our “Etuis”, the moment of Jetztzeit93 – 
“jetzt oder nie”/“now or never”, which is the battlefield of any 
fundamental political act or decision is what shall be brought into 
focus in this chapter. We have thus far said a great deal about the Ø, 
the void as well as the notion of the One. In what follows, we will 
concentrate on what it means to speak of the subject as a vanishing 
mediator – what shall now be brought into focus is the zero. 
In order to approximate this zero, this vanishing mediator, a text by 
Walter Benjamin is instructive. In 1931, Benjamin wrote a short94 but 
quite remarkable account of what he calls ‘the destructive character.’95 
Although opaque, this text, this destructive character can – I wager – 
be read as something like a lover avant la lettre – a radically loving 
something. Referring to it as a thing is by no means random. Benjamin 
too was hesitant to speak of it as a someone. The reason for this shall 
become clear in the course of the following pages. 
First of all, the destructive character is the category of being faithful 
to what has happened – to follow Badiou, we might say that the 
destructive character is faithful to an event. It is this something that 
clings onto a certain idée fixe that something special has happened for 
sure. It calls it by its (or her, or his) name and continues to spell out 
                                                           
92
 For an extended discussion of the notion of the Borromean knot see: Lacan, Jacques: 
Seminar RSI (unpublished). 
93
 Benjamin, Walter: Über den Begriff der Geschichte. In: Illuminationen. Ausgewählte 
Schriften. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp. Bd.1, pp.251-261. 
94
 It is only two pages long. I short yet extremely powerful Denkbild. 
95
 Benjamin, Walter: Der destruktive Charakter. In: Illuminationen. Ausgewählte 
Schriften. Bd.1. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, pp.289-290. 
46 
 
the name of this sublime in our midst; it is a neurotic force.96 In short: 
the destructive character is a lovesick maniac, who annoys everyone 
with his illuminist ideas. 
Let me give you a short example for the sake of clarification. Some 
time ago, I watched the latest film by Mike Leigh97, which is about 
this girl whose bike gets stolen and so decides that now the time has 
come to learn how to drive. Her driving instructor, Scott, is a nice 
example of a destructive loving character before he is counted as One 
(or as the One, if you prefer the more romantic version). He is 
basically presented to the audience through Poppy’s (the woman’s) 
eyes (the question of perspective is of utmost importance in this 
respect). The viewers see his entirely maniacal, illuminist, stalking 
and crazily staring side. If we are honest with ourselves, we would 
admit that our sympathy for him wavers between amusement, disgust 
and uncanny anxiety – he is, quite frankly, weird, disgusting (of 
course, he is also not very handsome) and a bit dangerous (they nearly 
get into a car accident because he goes crazy – and, even pulls her 
hair). Obviously she is not into him. He freaks her out. 
Now, what does this stalking, ‘abnormal’ lover, this terrorist threat 
have to do with love, subjectivity and a dialectics of recognition? And 
what does all this have to do with Walter Benjamin? 
In order to answer these questions, the given example has to be 
slightly reshaped . Our focus (perspective) need only undergo a 
minimal shift in order to receive quite a different result. So, what 
would the situation look like if Poppy had shared Scott’s feelings? Let 
us imagine, for example, that she – unsure whether he likes her or not 
–returns home from a fun day out to find him looking up to her 
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window from the other side of the road; but this time he is not staring 
crazily but, instead, longingly looking up to her window from the 
other side of the road – a loving gesture, a sweet sign. The film’s 
focus or perspective has thus shifted and instead of seeing an uncanny 
and violent intrusion of private space the spectator would be witness 
to a sweet scene of love. … And they lived happily ever after. 
Love is all about finding the ‘right’ perspective on things. This shift 
from seeing in the other that which is in excess of this other (the abyss 
of the Real, the terrorist notion of negativity) and then counting this 
excess as exactly that which counts; or, in other words, being exposed 
to the freak within the other (Eric Santner calls it the creaturely98) and 
regarding this freakishness as that which creates our knight in shining 
armor – this is what is found at the core of subjectivation proper. And 
this is also what is not present in the theories of both Badiou and 
Derrida. In Derrida, it is lacking because he does not care about the 
subject at all; in Badiou, it has to be absent because he is not 
interested in any form of dialectics of recognition. What counts for 
Badiou is decision, not perspective. Badiou’s subject is a singleton, 
sublated only in a dyad (between herself and the o/Other, the event), 
not a triad between herself, the o/Other and, again, a third party which 
is witness to this act of love.99  
But this third party is indispensible for any theory of the subject. 
Through third party perspective is generated, the fatally attractive 
actions of the destructive character are no longer seen as following a 
weird idée fixe, but are picked up as what they always will have been 
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(the tense of love is the future perfect, that which ‘will always have 
been,’ ‘we always will have been meant for one another’) – heroic 
gestures of love. To be sure, love is a risky business which forces the 
subject into a state of exception, desubjectifying100 her, reducing her 
to this per se destructive force which can only be turned productive if 
that force is taken as a signal ,“ein Signal”, as Benjamin writes. 
And here we are – back with Benjamin and the destructive character. 
This is what can be preserved from Benjamin’s text. Let us have a 
look at the opening passage: 
“Es könnte einem geschehen, dass er, beim Rückblick auf 
sein Leben zu der Erkenntnis käme, fast alle tieferen 
Bindungen, die er in ihm erlitten habe, seien von 
Menschen ausgegangen, über deren “destruktiven 
Charakter” alle Leute sich einig waren.”101 
It is by no means arbitrary that the destructive character is only 
introduced indirectly. It is not a subject that appears on stage but an-
other subject who, when looking back at her life, will become aware 
that it was this destructive force which played the most significant role 
within it. Thus, the destructive character is introduced from the very 
beginning as a form of being for an other, as the condition of 
possibility for the o/Other in the sense that it is the basis of any deeper 
social bond between human beings. “Alle tieferen Bindungen” – all 
deeper bonds are a result of the destructive character’s ongoing labor, 
its fidelity to follow the ways it sees, its busy work of clearing the 
scene, wiping it clean for the new. The new – “die Zukunft” – this is, 
however, something it is not interested in; it is not part of its job. It is 
a cleaner, not a creator; on the side of the negative not the positive: 
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“(Er) kennt nur eine Parole: Platz schaffen”102 – that is to say, this 
something does not look into the future, does not pursue any definite 
(understandable) goals. 
Or, to put it differently, in Critique of Violence103 Benjamin is talking 
about a similar concept of destruction: in his distinction between the 
proletarian strike and the general strike, the destructive character is to 
be found on the side of the revolutionary general strike, the one which 
has the power to suspend the law. In this context he writes: 
“Der Gegensatz in beiden Auffassungen zeigt sich in 
voller Schärfe angesichts des revolutionären 
Generalstreiks. In ihm wird die Arbeiterschaft jedesmal 
sich auf ihr Streikrecht berufen, der Staat aber diese 
Berufung einen Missbrauch nennen, da das Streikrecht 
“so” nicht gemeint gewesen sei” (p.47)104 
A few lines later the notion of violence proper to this context –  let’s 
call it the destructive character’s violence – is introduced: 
“Wäre nämlich Gewalt, was sie zunächst scheint, das 
bloße Mittel, eines Beliebigen, das gerade erstrebt wird, 
unmittelbar sich zu versichern, so könnte sie nur als 
raubende Gewalt ihren Zweck erfüllen. Sie wäre völlig 
untauglich, auf relativ beständige Art Verhältnisse zu 
begründen oder zu modifizieren. Der Streik aber zeigt, 
dass sie dies vermag, dass sie imstande ist, 
Rechtsverhältnisse zu begründen und zu modifizieren, wie 
sehr das Gerechtigkeitsgefühl sich auch dadurch beleidigt 
finden möchte.” (p.48)105 
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 (He) only knows one slogan: Making room. (my translation) 
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 Cf. Benjamin, Walter: Zur Kritik der Gewalt. Und andere Aufsätze. Frankfurt am 
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It is not only the revolutionary general strike that amazes and attracts 
others, but also the dirty deeds of “der große Verbrecher”106 . In these 
deeds, the promise/threat of creating a new order of goods107 is 
inscribed. The destructive character is such a great villain avant la 
lettre. Its actions are a permanent threat to the (existing) law; it 
touches its roots, shaking its foundations. By acting without the gaze 
immanent to the system – that is, a gaze directed towards the future – 
the destructive character is the zero, the vanishing mediator between 
old and new, neither good nor bad; and for that very reason, the 
destructive character is the condition of possibility for the rise of any 
such (ethical) order. In its bodily appearance, it is the political 
intervention proper. And it is in exactly this sense Benjamin’s claim – 
that the destructive character is “das große Band, das alles 
Bestehende einträchtig umschlingt”108 – must be understood. 
This fact might explain Benjamin’s – and our – hesitance to refer to 
this force, to this something as a someone. It is not the act of an 
individual, but the very founding gesture of subjectivity; in this sense, 
it is a radical non-subject, it is subjectivity’s negative (empty) side. 
Benjamin calls this category a “character”, an agent stripped of all 
human, characteristic traits, a strange, somehow floating entity, 
passionately attached to ways only it can see: 
“Der destruktive Charakter sieht nichts Dauerndes. Aber 
eben darum sieht er überall Wege. Wo andere auf Mauern 
oder Gebirge stoßen, auch da sieht er einen Weg. Weil er 
                                                                                                                                                                          
A Strike, however, renders visible it that violence is capable of doing so. It is able to 
found new legal relationships or modify them, however this may affront one’s feeling of 
justice.” (my translation) 
106
 “the great villain“ 
107
 A new ethical order. 
108
 “the big bond harmoniously encompassing everything” (my translation) 
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aber überall einen Weg sieht, hat er auch überall aus dem 
Weg zu räumen.” (p.290)109 
If the destructive character’s actions are not picked up as a “Signal” 
they will be perceived as terrorism proper, a defiant child wanting to 
go through walls head first, fighting for something not represented 
within the law and thus not understandable at all – where it sees oh so 
many ways, others see only barricades, the comfortable lining of their 
“Etuis.” 
As such, it is a terrorist agent within the law that no longer belongs to 
the law – it becomes an outcast between two deaths: 
“Der destruktive Charakter lebt nicht aus dem Gefühl, 
dass das Leben lebenswert sei, sondern dass der 
Selbstmord die Mühe nicht lohnt.” (p.290)110 
Indeed, Benjamin’s destructive character and Lacan’s Antigone share 
the same form of proto-subjectivity. Like Antigone, Benjamin’s 
destructive character is a picture of beauty111 as much as it is one of 
terror. He is “jung” (young) und “heiter” (blithe). The word “heiter” 
amazes me in this context as it evokes pictures of clear blue skies, 
happy smiles and easy listening music, but also – and because of these 
associations – a strange form of detachment. 
The connection between destruction and beauty as delineated by 
Benjamin is especially interesting if we bear in mind that Benjamin 
was – and this fact is not often given the attention it deserves in 
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 “The destructive character does not see anything enduring. And, because of that, he 
sees ways everywhere. Where others bump against walls and mountains he sees a way. 
But because he sees a way everywhere he continuously needs to move things out of the 
way.” (my translation) 
110
 “The destructive character does not operate under the conviction that life is worth 
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no means random and shall be outlined in further detail in the next chapter on the role of 
the ‘work of art‘ in relation to the reign of the political. 
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Benjamin-studies – greatly influenced by the Kantian tradition. One of 
Benjamin’s earliest texts, Über das Programm einer kommenden 
Philosophie,112 already contains the seeds of what later will become 
the destructive character. Here we find an articulation of the duty of a 
philosophy to come: “Ahnungen die sie aus der Zeit und dem 
Vorgefühl einer großen Zukunft schöpft mit dem Kantschen System 
zu Erkenntnis werden zu lassen.”113 In other words, fusing the 
German-Jewish tradition of the sign with Kantian formalism is 
Benjamin’s epistemological agenda – but the destructive character 
goes beyond this program, giving it a firm political twist through the 
interlacing of ethical order and the notion of the beautiful. 
It is Kant’s merit to have pointed towards this relation. For Kant, the 
ethical (socio-symbolic) order, itself without concept (“ohne alle 
Begriffe, als Objekt eines allgemeinen Wohlgefallens”114) is another 
names for the symbol of the good, for that which serves as the order of 
good’s focal point. To say, a Being “without all concepts” is to say 
that judgement can never come to a definite concept of the beautiful. 
Here, Kant’s identifies the beautiful with the formal structure of 
means: “Schönheit ist Form der Zweckmäßigkeit eines Gegenstandes, 
sofern sie, ohne Vorstellung eines Zwecks, an ihm wahrgenommen 
wird”115). In Lacanian terms (and surely going beyond Kantian 
formalism in this respect), the beautiful is the signifier which cannot 
symbolize and precisely because of this, necessarily gives rise to the 
order of signifiers – that is, the socio-symbolic community. 
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This is how we should approach the sentence “dem destructiven 
Charakter schwebt kein Bild vor”.116 It cannot have a picture in mind 
when acting because it is itself this beautiful picture, “ein Signal” (a 
signal), a sign waiting to be picked up, given meaning and followed 
by others, thus transformed into the above-mentioned bond that 
connects all human beings. To be more specific: I claim that the 
destructive character is the picture (the imaginary surface, the re-
presentation) of the founding gesture of a new law at the same time as 
this picture remains dependent on the o/Other’s recognition. If this is 
not the case, if the destructive character is not interpreted as “Signal”, 
if it is not counted as “the One”, its actions will remain on the zero 
level of total destruction. 
It was Schelling117 who pointed out that good and bad are 
substantially the same thing, but distinguished according to different 
modes of observation.  Here the notion of perspective emerges once 
more: whether I am stalking or courting – every ethical act has to be 
seen in future perfect tense – I carry out an act and if I am lucky (if my 
zero of destruction, positivizing the void is counted as One) it will 
always have been ethical – three sides of the same thing. Of course, 
this is not about a continuous timeline – one after the other – but 
rather about the process which is the founding gesture of this kind of 
time as such. 
Isn’t this exactly the temporal mode Benjamin describes when he – in 
Über den Begriff der Geschichte writes: “Die Vergangenheit führt 
einen heimlichen Index mit, durch den sie auf die Erlösung verwiesen 
wird.”118? 
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So, back to the destructive character as this particular/peculiar thing 
that is also the establishing bond of humanity. As argued above, the 
destructive character, as the picture of either beauty or terror – those 
two sides of the same coin – must to be regarded as the scene of the 
birth of universality, being the symbolic Ur-Sprung of the universal 
structure. Or, in Badiouian terms, the destructive character is this 
seeming aporia which is the site of the event at the same time as it is 
the very subject (as an empty category) who affirms this site by 
spelling out its name. 
Why does this chapter bear the title ‘On Ø (void), 0 (zero) and 1 
(One)?’ We have underscored the obstacles that stand in the way of 
any prioritizing of either the void (Derrida) or the One (Badiou), 
obstacles that compel us to introduce a third term, a vanishing 
mediator that will suture the other two and give form to a new law. 
This third term has been introduced as the zero, the null of 
focalization, a symptomal knot which will always have been either 
terror or love according to the work of retroactivity. This third term 
has been introduced as a possible sign, a sign that is of no significance 
without the loving work of the o/Other who picks it up, renders it 
meaningful and gives it truth value. The world does not start with an 
‘I,’ but with an o/Other, with a you in her ultimate alterity: “You are 
absolutely strange because the world begins its turn with you.119 This 
is where a dialectics of recognition comes into play, a recognition that 
is not, however, fully sublatable, but will always leave a remainder, a 
restance, in the form of a materiality of the zero. Moving from zero to 
One will not render the former extinct. This movement is, in fact, 
similar to what Lacan called ‘traversing the fantasy,’ the act whereby 
the individual achieves subjective status by recognizing that the objet 
                                                                                                                                                                          
pp.251-261. “The past carries with it a secret index through which it is being referred 
back to redemption.” (my translation) 
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 Nancy, Jean-Luc: Being Singular Plural. Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press 2000, p.6. 
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a, which/who used to be the focal point of her desire, ‘is not really it’ 
and affirming the significance of a new objet a. What used to be the 
cause of desire will lose its significance (it will have to give way to 
the rule of the new law), but it will not vanish – the symptom will not 
disappear, a minimal remainder will always remain. This remainder is 
the sinthome. Thus, the transition from zero to One may also be 
grasped as the movement of traversing the fantasy as moving from 
symptom to sinthome. 
Gottlob Frege gives a neat (mathematical) account of the importance 
of the zero for any possibility of sustaining a universal order (a 
counted totality of being). His theorem clearly demonstrates that 
totality (a universal) cannot be pictured as a given, complete, formal 
structure; instead, totality only emerges through an immanent void 
sustaining it. To give a brief example: Let’s take 3+1. The result of 
this arithmetic is 4. And how can this be depicted? Well, 3+1 could 
also be written as: 
 
0  1 2 3 
 
Counting through zero (counting zero as One) is the fourth term and 
thus the result is: 
 
0  1 2 3 
1  2 3 4 
 
On an ontological level, we could say: Let there be X (a thing of the 
world) – this is identical with its concept (at least since Hegel) and is 
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then counted as One. As a result, all things of the world are given as 
1s: 1,1,1,1, – this series of concepts (or signifiers) is, however, not a 
universal (it’s a not yet counted multitude, it is what had previously 
been delineated as metonymy). In order to suture these singularities, it 
is necessary to count through zero, i.e. through a non-conceptualizable 
lack sustaining the universal (this is the empty set Ø). Rendering the 
void as 0 attaches a concept to this very lack, giving a name to that 
which cannot be said. This is the radical act of naming and thus 
becoming this name (there is no Ø if we remove the zero; the lack 
vanishes as well – the 0/name is the symbolic side of the Real void 
which is a nothing at all).120 
But the step from void to zero is not yet enough. As demonstrated by 
Frege’s theorem, it is necessary to count the zero as One in order to 
sustain the natural series of numbers – to be able to count, to make 
sense of the world, to be sublated in a universal structure, we have to 
count the zero as “the One”; the beginning (which is always a fake 
beginning, a multiplicity of beginnings)121, thereby always sutures the 
lack. The dialectical relationship at work here is one of immanent 
exclusion; or, in Hegelian terms, we have the concept of the concrete 
universal – the movement of negativity which breaks up the universal 
from within, reducing it to its particular content as one of itself. 
The surplus element that is represented but not present in the situation 
thus appears when we move from difference (différance) to 
antagonism; that is, when the zero appears (the presence of a terrorist 
negativity). And isn’t this also, as Žižek suggests, the move from 
Kantian formalism to Hegelian dialectics?122 – Isn’t this also the move 
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from a tension between phenomenon and thing to an inconsistency or 
gab between the phenomena themselves? Thus there is a shift of 
boundaries – from the outside to the inside insofar as the concept itself 
is no longer identical with itself. The destructive character is not 
pursuing any definite goals, anything beyond the socio-symbolic 
order; instead,  it names the rupture within the structure itself. And – 
this destructive character is also not some violent tyrant out there in 
the world, but the very faculty, within ourselves, that separates us 
from truly being ourselves; it is the uncanny rupture within ourselves. 
These three steps (Ø, 0, 1) should draw attention to the fact that not 
every act holds the potential to change the universal structure. 
Particularity has to have direct relation to the void of the situation. In 
this sense, Peter Hallward writes in his introduction to his book on 
Badiou: 
“Individuals become subjects in Badiou’s sense of the 
word if and only if this intervention conceived as a new 
criterion for action, is further consistent with a properly 
universal principle – that is, only if it is an invention with 
which everyone can in principle identify. Only such a 
principle can become the truth of a new sequence.”123 
The destructive character is such a principle; it is that through which 
the positivizing of the void of the situation may come to function as 
the founding gesture of a new universal structure or a “new sequence”. 
As Marx has pointed out, because the proletariat are capitalisms’ zero, 
stripped of all character traits, absolutely powerless within the 
structure, “having nothing to lose but their chains,”124 they, in the act 
of freeing themselves will thereby change the entire structure from 
within, freeing not only themselves but all human beings as such – 
their act of violence will have been a heroic one. 
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But it must be repeated that this act of affirming the One is incapable 
of introducing a new law unless it is recognized by others, picked up 
and counted as “the One.” This is the moment in which perspective 
shifts, in which terror becomes love, in which Scott is not presented to 
the spectator’s gaze as a crazy, love maniac and stalker, but as a sweet 
guy courting Poppy. This is the time and place of subjectivation (the 
imaginary/ideological closure within and through the new law). 
To bring these remarks into a tight form, we should note that the type 
of subjectivation advanced here is neither understood in its 
metonymical aspect, (i.e. dismissing subjectivity altogether in favor of 
a free play of différance) alone, nor in its exclusively metaphorical 
sense (as a form of radical rupture), but is, instead, presented as the 
interrelation of both sides, an interrelation that requires a third step in 
the form of a vanishing mediator. This zero focalization between ‘old’ 
and ‘new’ at the threshold of a traversing of the fundamental fantasy 
can be understood as a form of destructive character, who has to be 
taken as a signal by the o/Other, as the significant thing that really 
matters. 
It is this function, which through an act of radical love becomes the 
zero of the situation, the void’s name, an impossible necessity, a 
concept which can never fully symbolize. 
I therefore claim that the loving labor of the destructive character is 
not the ‘final’ step in the process of subjectivation, but functions, 
instead, as the condition of possibility for subjectivity as such. In 
naming the void, by becoming the void’s symbolic side (its name), the 
destructive character functions as a possible signal for the rise of an 
altered universal. As a positivized rupture, it is significant for all 
human beings. As such, it is a sign which is “von allen Seiten dem 
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Gerede ausgesetzt.”125 Despite the fact that the destructive character 
does not, itself, participate in the “Gerede” (gossiping), it remains the 
founding gesture of that “Gerede,” of the socio-symbolic community, 
and creates the symbolic bond of language that connects his fellow 
human beings to each other. 
Love – and as such any form of dialectics of recognition – is first of 
all a violent act that belongs  on the side of the destructive character, 
an act which will remain on the zero level of irrational and total 
destruction unless it is addressed to someone for whom this address 
will be significant – to someone who counts the zero as “the One”, the 
act, in Lacanian words, that makes the discourse shift.126 
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4. The Art of Letting Go: Realized Utopia and the 
Aesthetic Regime 
Let us traverse again the paths we have covered thus far before 
proceeding. We have been concerned, in general, with the conditions 
of possibility for the appearance of something as notorious as a 
subject, as well as the structural foundations of subjectivity and 
subjectivation as such. Following the paths of Jacques Derrida and 
Alain Badiou, we have drawn on Jacques Lacan’s understanding of 
subjectivation as an interrelation of metonymy and metaphor, the 
uncounted representation of a heterogeneous set of elements 
(différance) as well as the radical decision of the introduction of a new 
One, i.e. metaphoric quilting. It has been argued that the notion of the 
subject has to be grasped as an effect of this back and forth between 
metonymy and metaphor at the same time as it is regarded as the 
agent of this very interplay (a form of negative dialectics of 
recognition). In this respect, the subject can be grasped as a vanishing 
mediator that only makes its appearance on stage during the moment 
of danger, the moment of ‘disaster’. 
This subject – as the zero point of focalization – thus seems to be 
caught in a space between two deaths. Recall that Benjamin’s 
destructive character was presented as a characteristic representative 
of such a subject in Chapter 3. But we should also mention that Lacan 
provides us with a different example in his Seminar Book VII (The 
Ethics of Psychoanalysis), in the figure of Antigone. This seminar 
session carries with it the prominent title: Antigone – Between two 
Deaths. Antigone is here described as located at the very intersection 
of beauty and the sublime; or, to put it differently, the question Lacan 
raises in this text is one of the appearance the subject (as a fader127 
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which neither belongs to the old law on account of its non-belonging 
nor to any new order because it is itself the founding gesture of any 
such new law.) 
The question which interests me in Antigone - and which shall be 
examined in further detail here in a chapter on what I will be calling 
the ‘true work of art’ (a form of art which bears witness to the void 
and which, as shall be seen in the course of this chapter, is itself a 
distinct form of truth procedure) –  is not that which concerns the 
latent content of Antigone’s story and what it can tell us about the 
process of subjectivation; instead, what is of interest to me is the way 
in which art itself – and we should not forget that Antigone is first of 
all a play, a mythic script and not a ‘real’ person – expresses a certain 
mode of thinking which is also the basis of our own being in the 
world. In other words, I shall examine what Jacques Rancière has 
called the ‘aesthetic regime’ in its function as the basis of all forms of 
political intervention.128 
Recall that the subject has been characterized here as something 
fleeting, a necessary impossibility which cannot be sustained for very 
long. It is neither zero nor One, but the very transition from one to the 
other. Rather than viewing the subject as a mere (static) category, one 
should also regard it as a process, that which materializes itself in the 
act of traversing the fantasy and comes to live in the transformation of 
the symptom (the objet a as the cause of the individual’s desire) into 
the sinthome (a remainder, a sign). Lacan alluded to this very 
transformation in his account of Antigone, a transformation that is 
deeply aesthetic. But the sense of this ‘aesthetic’ must be framed 
correctly: it is neither a judgment of taste, nor the type of 
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“aesthetization of politics”129 Benjamin refers to derogatively, but a 
“primary aesthetics,”130 a “system of a priori forms determining what 
presents itself to sense experience”131. Antigone is alternatively 
referred to as both a “beautiful” and a “sublime” entity. This swaying 
between the categories of the beautiful and the sublime is – at least in 
my understanding – by no means random.  
What is distinct about the work of art132 is its conspicuous form of in-
betweenness, an in-betweenness that will be brought into sharper 
focus in the course of this chapter. Although it is surely the case that 
the title of this work already alludes to in-betweenness (hence all the 
dashes in ‘re-petition,’ ‘re-signation,’ ‘re-signification’), the question 
warrants a more precise articulation: what, I now ask, are the political 
aspects of the ‘true’ work of art; what is the nature of the potential 
specific to its form (or, in Rancière’s words –its specific mode). It is 
this understanding of the aesthetic regime as a mode of thinking 
underlying every socio-symbolic order which is responsible for 
equipping the work of art with its distinct political potentials as well 
as agency:  
It is on the basis of this primary aesthetics that it is 
possible to raise the question of ‘aesthetic practices’ as I 
understand them, that is forms of visibility that disclose 
artistic practices, the place they occupy, what they ‘do’ or 
‘make’ from the standpoint of what is common to the 
community.”133 (p.13) 
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Aesthetic practices, according to Rancière produce and arrange what 
he calls ‘communal bodies’134. 
The ‘true’ work of art bears witness to that which serves as the 
constitutive negativity within the state of any given situation. This 
bearing witness materializes itself in the work of art itself. In this 
respect, it can be grasped as the framing of that which upholds the 
situation but cannot be presented, that which is there, all over, but not 
sayable. In this respect, it is art that shatters the given system of 
representation by re-inscribing its constitutive exclusion/excess within 
it once more.  
Three central suppositions may be found at the core of this 
examination of the structural qualities and political potentials of the 
art-work, the work of art respectively. Although these suppositions 
have preoccupied my inquiry since the earliest investigation into the  
foundations of subjectivity, they will now be related to what can be 
regarded – in line with Rancière – as the basis of any form of political 
action and thus of subjectivity as such.135 
In our examonation of Benjamin’s destructive character, this special 
entity was characterized as the zero point of focalization of any given 
order. Something that is situated at a special place within the symbolic 
order, belonging in its non-belonging, unspeaking but serving as the 
very cause of language as such, a distinct sign which nevertheless 
requires its being picked up by the o/Other. 
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As a product of the aesthetic regime,136  the work of art is similar in 
structure to what has been said about the nature of the subject and 
subjectivity. It is for this reason that Lacan’s account of Antigone 
describes her in terms of beauty and sublimity; it is for this reason that 
Benjamin’s account of the destructive character regards this figure 
‘heiter’ and accords to it the beauty and attraction that profoundly 
draws us towards the ‘great villain.’ Speaking from a structural 
perspective, the work of art is located at a very special place within 
the socio-symbolic community, within the state of the situation. And it 
is this very place that allows it to become the symbol of a 
‘community-to-come’, i.e. to re-signate the status quo and thus re-
signify it. This is how the work of art’s double nature – much like the 
subject’s double nature, as outlined before – should be grasped. On 
the one hand, it is a work, an act and in this respect a symbol. It is that 
which has taken place, both visible and closed – be it a sculpture, a 
symphony, a happening, etc. On the other hand, because it presents 
itself as a symbol, a sign which urges the o/Other to pick it up, the 
work of art should be understood as something that is constantly in 
progress, in flux. In this respect, it has to be grasped as an opening up 
towards that which shall be.137 In Lacanian terms, the ‘true’ work of 
art is nothing else then the quilting (the metaphoric effect) of the 
metonymic chain, the possibility of an introduction of a new law.138 
The remarkable feature of the work of art is that – and as opposed to 
the subject which can only be understood as a vanishing mediator – 
when something flashes up in the moment of utmost danger, the art-
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work has the potential to persist at the place of this aporia it opens up 
itself. It is intractable, it does not vanish, it does not leave us but 
continues haunting us, our eyes, our ears and even our bodily 
sensations. Thus, the work of art is stasis (a remainder, a restance) as 
well as dynamis (an opening up, this what urges us to talk about it to 
constitute ourselves in relation to it). It is, to express it in Walter 
Benjamin’s words, a materialization of a ‘dialectics at a standstill.’ 
The characteristic trait of this ‘true’ form of art – of art which bears a 
distinct relation to the void of the situation from which it arises - is 
that it is the marker of a minimal (and liminal) differential 
displacement. ‘Minimal,’ because any single work of art is not only 
unable to overcome the entire given regime of representation, but also 
because the art-work’s potential is not caught in its capacity for grand 
gestures, but is, instead, best figures in the form of a fundamental 
diminuation. This specific form of alterity must not be understood as a 
relation of opposition in respect to any given norm; instead it should 
be grasped as the framing of the norm’s constitutive negativity which 
is always somehow represented but never fully present.139   
In the given state of the situation, this negativity is the backstage of 
the main stage of actions that appear to us as events – events which 
keep up appearances and thus structure the field of representation. But 
it is not the main stage which is the most important one; it is the 
backstage that really matters the most. The latter is the anchoring 
point of the conditions of possibility which form the chore of the 
representative system. Thus, the backstage’s events, the events which 
are truthful to the void are figured in the ‘true’ work of art, a work that 
is situated on quite a different level from the field of what I shall refer 
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to as semblance-events. These semblances lack the possibility of a 
truth event, an event that is the re-inscription of that which has to 
always be excluded, that which is always already deprived of its 
presentation within the given order of being. Semblances are the 
beautiful appearances or vividly-hedonistic and colorful ‘event-
culture,’ but they bear no relation whatsoever to that which is referred 
to here as a ‘true’ work of art. Only the latter carries within itself  the 
potential to bear witness to the void, to constitute itself from this very 
void and, through this, reinscribe the Ø in the form of becoming its 0, 
its zero, the quilting point of subjective desire, the promise of the new 
to come. 
This is the reason why the ‘true’ art-work cannot belong to the 
industrious field of the cultural market. Or, rather, of course it belongs 
– my claim is not that artistic production should only be considered 
art, political art, if it happens in the ‘underground,’ if it does not ‘sell 
out,’ if it remains resistant, unsublated within the representative 
system of the capitalist economy. Thinking about art like this, as the 
inauguration of the ‘totally different,’ the ‘non-all’, aloof/next to the 
given order, would quite obviously mean to choose the very 
dangerous path of demeaning a l’art pour l’art (be this motivated by 
the hope to be able to establish an ‘alternative order next to the given 
one,’ or related to the neo-sensualist wish to ‘fully remain in 
negativity, or différance’). Such an understanding of the work of art 
would cut its ties to the field of truth, throwing it back into the reign 
of semblance. But since the artwork’s participation would have to be 
denied, this would, in the end, lead to a senseless reproduction of the 
system’s very logic while supposing it to be something entirely 
different. 
But for us, the way in which the work of art’s relation to the 
representational system of capitalist production shall be grasped is not 
however, in terms of opposition. It is neither the introduction of a 
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liberal-utopian pluralism of ‘multiple orders’, nor does it bear relation 
to any form of hedonistic hyper-sensualism. The truth of artistic 
production lies in the significance role it plays as a punctual caesura 
for the inauguration and perpetuation of a universal structure. 
An understanding of the art-work as societies’ zero may shed a new 
light on the role between belonging and non-belonging society is 
marked by. Obviously the art-work belongs to the logic of the system 
(there is nothing ‘outside’ this logic, no other language which it could 
make use of other than the one introduced by the symbolic system). It 
belongs, yet resists full integration; the work of art does not belong 
through a type of frictionless participation, but via a refractory breach. 
It breaks with the seamless continuum of time in becoming the 
system’s materialized symptom, its quilting point (and with this 
starting point as well as the moment of the system’s inauguration – 
dialectics at a standstill). To once again make use of the above 
mentioned metaphor, the work of art is the backstage of the theatrical 
scene of beautiful semblance, the condition of possibility of any form 
of appearence, that ‘main stage’ of representation. 
This is what characterizes any ‘true’ form of art: a specific form of 
(political) engagement which marks an intervention, a caesura, which, 
as a sign or symbol, and in this respect, event, opens the way for the 
new – not in the way of introducing an ‘alternative logic’ to the 
system but through becoming that very logic’s minimal difference, an 
anchoring point giving form to the formless, to that which is the cause 
of the symbolic system at the same time as it always avoids the 
system’s count. It is the re-inscription (and through this, the re-
signification) of the situation’s immanent exclusion, the sublation of 
the formative particular into the universal. Thus, Rancière’s 
conception of the aesthetic system as a mode of thinking becomes 
clearer. The ‘true’ work of art is the aesthetic practice of forming the 
communal body of society. To speak of aesthetic practices is always 
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already to ask questions concerning the possibilities and probabilities 
of a change of paradigms to come, questions about the probabilities of 
introducing a new truth (a new set of mechanisms of inclusion and 
exclusion).  
It is for this reason that the work of art has been introduced as a 
persisting practice which always already both an everlasting, never 
ceasing resistance, a remainder (restance) that gives an account of the 
conditions of reality and representation at the same time as it is the 
reason why this reality will never coincide with its own re-
presentation. It is a monument to the refractory breach with reality, 
frozenly persisting throughout time, as well as a symbol for 
intervention and active engagement that always moves towards the 
realization of a justice to come. And because the work of art cannot 
cease to insist, because it is marked and determined by the 
impossibility of closure, because it always keeps its door open for that 
which might come, for that which shall come, because of these 
qualities of the work of art is also the battleground of that which is 
called utopia, itself is a necessary impossibility. It is ‘necessary’ 
because in order for it to insert into the scene a more just frame of the 
status quo, a symbol is required that will render it possible to think 
that which shall come without conceptualizing it solely in opposition 
to the given order. And it is ‘impossible’ because it can never be fully 
realized. Utopia does and does not have its place within the state of the 
situation. We cannot live in this place called utopia; its time – the 
same time that is the time of the work of art – will most necessarily 
always remain exterior to ours. A ‘realized utopia’ – a contradiction in 
terms. It has to lack in order for it to make us dream and strive for it. 
Dream and strive for it – this is what art makes us do and it is also 
what we have to do, we have to re-inscribe this negativity, we have to 
remain faithful/true to this event which the work of art confronts us 
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with. This is what the ‘true’ work of art makes us do – this is what the 
‘true’ work of art does. 
It is this significant/signifying structural position of the work of art as 
caught in the in-betweenness of resistance and resignification, the in-
betweenness of void and One, at the threshold of transition that opens 
the way towards the new through the act of persisting, of letting go. 
Like the destructive character who sees only ways but no goals, who 
only participates in community through non-participation, through the 
act of becoming the community’s minimal difference in the form of a 
symptomal knot around which this very community’s desire is 
structured.  
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5. Let me (un)do you: Bodily Encounters and Political 
Re-Signification 
‘Can you hold me a second!? … Don’t touch me … Don’t touch me! 
… Don’ …’ These confusing, but probably all too familiar sounding 
words are those of Billy Brown from one of the sweetest and most 
silent love stories ever put on screen: Vincent Gallo’s 1998 film 
Buffalo 66140. Gallo’s  story concerns the o/Other and the 
(im)possibility of coming to terms with her: Billy (played by Vincent 
Gallo), having just been released from prison (‘I was innocent’ – and 
indeed he was) is heading towards the home of his parents, to whom 
he had justified his being out of the city because he was working for 
the government. On the way to their place, Billy stops at a dance 
school (he has to take a leak real badly) where he accidentally runs 
into Layla (Christina Ricci) and kidnaps her (probably also more by 
chance than on purpose – he seems to be rather upset, confused, and 
not really in the mood to think about how to survive the upcoming 
traumatic encounter with his parents). Billy urges Layla to tell his 
parents that she is his girlfriend, that they met in high school, and 
‘have been sweethearts ever since.’ 
Layla, on the other hand, is a funny girl. She does not at all seem upset 
by the fact that she has just been kidnapped – violently pulled out of 
the dance school, dragged through the parking lot and pushed into her 
car in order to drive Billy to his parents’ place. She does not seem hurt 
by all the bawdy and brutal insults Billy throws at her either. In fact, 
she seems (for whatever reason) to have been rather into him from the 
start. 
As they get to his parents’ house, Billy cannot bear the pressure any 
longer. He makes her sit down on the front porch with him. Sitting on 
the top of the stairs, he bends over nervously and helplessly holds his 
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legs. He is shaking and turns towards Layla for comfort: ‘Can you 
hold me a second!? … Don’t touch me …. Don’t touch me! … Don’ 
…’ 
This scene manages to compress the plot of the entire film into one 
compelling and passionate picture raising the question of how it is 
possible to let oneself be touched by an other, how it is possible to 
touch an other, i.e. how it is possible to love one another. In a single 
scene, a single gesture and a single line of words, the double bind in 
which human beings seem to be so relentlessly tied up in is exposed. It 
is the aporia we most necessarily have to get stuck in whenever we 
want to turn towards our neighbor, the person next to us, the person 
closest to us: we need the others, we need their touch, their presence, 
their words, and their caressing – yet, we cannot have it, we just can’t 
stand it, it makes us sick. Defense (in the clinical usage of the term) is 
all about this phenomenon of striving for this ultimate thing in the 
other at the same time as we are feverishly trying not to get too close 
to it. This is where desire comes into play – we can only desire (or 
long for) something we do not have, something we are trying to get to. 
Reaching it would literally be the end, our end.141 ‘Can you hold me a 
second!? … Don’t touch me … Don’t touch me! … Don’ …’ 
Thus far we have progressed in three steps: first, the subject’s nature 
has been examined as an effect of the metonymic/metaphoric process 
of writing forth and quilting. A process in which it does not suffice to 
focus on différance alone, on the free play of the in-between, on 
neither the signifier-to-signifier nature of the metonymic chain, nor 
the radical act of metaphoric intervention, an act whereby a new truth 
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(in the form of a new master signifier) is introduced and consequently 
followed. This first step has been illustrated through a comparison and 
analysis of the approaches of Jacques Derrida and Alain Badiou– the 
former, as I have argued, is more interested in the significance of 
metonymy in the form of a signifying trace, while the latter is, on the 
contrary, concerned with the act in the form of a new truth event. 
Chapter 3 has supplemented the insights drawn from both Chapter 1 
and Chapter 2 by introducing the notion of a (negative) dialectics of 
recognition, a form of recognition that renders visible the importance 
of the o/Other for the successful establishment of the new to come. We 
have seen that the subject is also a name for the vanishing mediator, 
this zero point of focalization that requires an o/Other in order for it to 
be transformed into a new One. It requires someone else to see it, pick 
up this zero and give it the meaning of a sign, something that counts 
(‘this is really it,’ ‘this is what it should be like,’ ‘this is you,’ ‘this is 
us’). 
Another step in the progress of my argument revolved around the 
notion of the work of art, wherein the art-work was analyzed as 
something not exterior to the process of subjectivation but, on the 
contrary, deeply and structurally connected to this process. The work 
of art’s distinct potential lies in its ability to display a materialization 
of the zero of subjectivation. In other words, thus far we have moved 
from formless subjectivity to its embodiment in the material form of 
the work of art, from a vanishing, never graspable mediator to a 
resisting and persisting force sublated and visibly displayed through 
art. 
In the present chapter, Billy Brown has been introduced as someone 
desperately longing to be touched but still unable to let someone else 
do this for him, unable to even let another speak of his disability to 
touch an other– except when touching someone to make this person 
stop touching him (‘Don’t do this to me’). We will have to come back 
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to this strange form of touching designed to stop the other from 
touching oneself. So, after touching upon the notion of the subject as 
well as the art-work as embodiment, a restance of the process of 
subjectivation, this last chapter is preocuppied with what has been left 
outside, what has not yet been touched upon so far even though its 
signifier adorn this works’ title page so boastfully. A lot has been said 
about the subject in general and the ontological status of the process of 
subjectivation in particular. And many words have been spent on art 
and its relation to this very process, as well as about the political 
potentials of subjective as well as artistic intervention. But, and here it 
is, this last but, this but that indicates that something is still missing, 
this analysis has missed out on something fundamental, but still so 
hard to grasp … but, what about the body? 
Between subjectivity, subjectivation, art, and artistic intervention, 
between the process of re-petition, re-signation, and re-signification, 
where does the body find its place? What does it even mean to have a 
body? And what does this mean if I tell you that I want to speak of 
political bodies, i.e. bodies that can no longer be regarded as a pre-
given substance but as something that belongs to the same register as 
that of the subject and art? This register has been introduced as the 
space where the conditions of possibility of a new to come are at stake 
– but, where does the body find its place here?  
When speaking about the body, we necessarily have to speak about 
how the body presents itself to us, how we perceive our own bodies 
and those of others – we first of all have to speak of the way we touch 
each other, touch upon one another. This shall then also shed light on 
the expression ‘political bodies,’ for the body (or rather we will have 
to talk about bodies) always already carries with it the dimension of 
the political. 
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In order to come to terms with the body, however, we have to first 
speak of this: ‘Can you hold me a second!? … Don’t touch me … 
Don’t touch me! … Don’ …’ For there is something within the other 
that amazes us, something that attracts us and to which we are drawn 
most profoundly at the same time as this Ding (thing) is also the very 
reason why we are so fundamentally scared of the other, sometimes 
even appalled by her in her otherness. 
Facing the o/Other, we are not only turning towards someone who 
puts us together, who comforts and caresses us, who holds us and 
makes us complete. This o/Other who puts us together is first of all 
someone who will relentlessly tear us apart, incapable of holding us 
without ripping us apart, of loving us without hating us, of making 
herself anything other than hated by us … in love and through love. 
Love thy neighbor – Freud already pointed out the ambivalence in this 
imperative. Or, as Judith Butler has put it: “Let’s face it. We’re 
undone by each other. And if we’re not, we’re missing something.”142 
We require the other’s body, which first of all presents itself to us in 
its most alien and –perhaps most importantly – alienating form. The 
body is first of all something we have to lose in order to be able to 
seize. To illustrate this, let us take the simplest example provided by 
psychoanalyses: the mother’s breast. It is first of all the infant’s 
primary source of jouissance, belonging to herself, examplar of unity 
with the m/Other’s breast. Bruce Fink account for this in the following 
way:  
“The infant did not consider the breast to belong to 
another person (indeed, the concept of belonging or 
possession was as yet unknown), but in the course of 
weaning – a form of separation, loosely speaking – it is 
experienced as wrenched away, as lost. It is not so much 
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the mOther the child loses in separation as the erotic 
object, the object that provided so much pleasure.”143 
Our first loss is the loss of a partial object, a bodily part belonging to 
the o/Other; but with this very loss, we come upon the birth of our 
own bodies – the impression of autonomy and fullness, through the 
birth of the individuals’ bodily re-presentation in and through the 
mirror. We learn to see each other as singularly functioning little 
units, our bodies becoming a cover for ourselves, providing us with 
shelter to shut us off from the world outside. We turn into who we are, 
autonomous beings, speaking beings saying I do and I am at the same 
time as this I begins to coincide with the limits of our own bodies. 
What is then left outside of this picture – what has to be displaced – 
whenever we say I, whenever the little baby looks into the mirror and 
turns around in order to see whether the o/Other, is the o/Other’s gaze; 
the baby looks to see what the other sees – an autonomous little being, 
of course, but a little being for an other.144  
We are taught to perceive ourselves as having forgotten about the 
importance of the o/Other’s (bodily) presence within this process. But 
if we want to speak about the body, if we want to grasp the sense of a 
body, if I want to touch upon my body, I will first of all have to start 
with you. At first glance, this might appear to be a paradox because all 
I have to do in order to come to terms with my body is to take a look 
in the mirror; or, if I do not happen to have a mirror, I can touch 
myself, feel my skin, touch my mouth, look at my hands, my fingers, 
and toenails, feel what it feels like to be at this very place I call my 
body, belonging to me and no one else but me. But still, our bodies are 
for-another, they are not existing next to each other – one singleton 
next to another one, moving freely throughout time and space. Instead 
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they bear a distinct relation to each other – “there’s no autos, no 
‘self’.”145 They are woven into each other, touch upon one another. I 
touch upon you and this is where the production of my I first occurs 
(as well as it is, of course, also the site of the inauguration of you). If 
we fail to acknowledge this we are, as Judith Butler points out, 
missing an important fact related to the formation and foundation of 
the socio-political sphere: 
“If my fate is not originally or finally separable from 
yours, then ‘we’ is traversed by a rationality that we 
cannot easily argue against; or, rather, we can argue 
against it, but we would be denying something 
fundamental about the social conditions of our very 
formation.”146 
The production of me and you happens through the passage of a we. 
Or, put differently, the individuation of the body requires yet another 
body, a body which in this context shall be called the political body of 
a community to come. Yet this community is not to be understood as a 
plurality of bodies which gather around one another in order to form a 
still bigger one, the community of a political body – it is not to be 
understood as the Leviathan. It is not to be understood as a community 
of individual bodies becoming one big communal body which 
produces meaning and, through this, functions in society like little 
units. There is no such thing as a community of bodies, there is only 
my body, and your body, and a community to come.  
But before turning towards the structural definitions as well as the 
ethical implications produced by the political body of a community to 
come, let us first focus on the notion of the body once again and have 
a look at what it means to have a body and be in a world populated by 
bodies. For, as has been argued, the body – according to the 
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conventional understanding of this notion – is something which will 
always already be sacrificed, which is there, here, visible, but still 
perpetually evading our grasp. To present it in analogous form to what 
has been demonstrated in Chapter 1, we might therefore say that the 
body is always sliding beneath the body (as signification or re-
presentation): 
 
Body (representation) 
Body (presentation) 
 
The body is always already untouchable, inscrutable, it “is already 
elsewhere while nonetheless being present: here, but not right 
here.”147 Of course, this does not mean that the human body is 
untouchable (that we are all pariahs); we touch each other day to day, 
we shake hands, we hug, we kiss, we push and pull, we beat and hold 
each other. But still, something evades our touch – and this Ding 
(thing), which cannot be grasped by reaching for the body is the body 
itself, the body in its full immediate presentation. Between me and 
you, our bodies are constituted, but in this process there is something 
which vanishes from the scene, subtracting itself from the re-
presentation of the body – that is, the presentation of the body. 
The relation this notion of the body bears to the concept of 
subjectivity – as established above – is one of analogy. Like the 
subject, the body is constituted through the metonymic-metaphoric 
process of writing, coming into presence because of its distance from 
itself, because of the constitutive absence it presents to itself. As a 
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process of writing, it is a form of touching148 between one and the 
o/Other, the body being neither the inscribed substance, nor the pen 
carrying out the writing, but the very liminal space where the pen 
touches the paper: 
“Thus, before its proper sense (or else infinitely beyond 
it), the text – or the speech – first demands its listener, he 
who has already entered into the proper listening of this 
text and has therefore entered into this text itself, into its 
most intimate movement of sense or of passing beyond 
sense and into its unworking.”149 
In this respect, it could be argued – and indeed Jean-Luc Nancy does 
so – that the body is the “incorporeality of ‘sense’.”150 It is situated 
outside discourse, that which can never be fully grasped by discourse, 
yet – and this is also the reason why Nancy goes so far as to state that 
the body can also be referred to as the subject – also the very 
condition of any possibility of discourse as such. It is situated at 
discourse’s limit, “at an extreme, outward edge that nothing closes 
up.”151 It is always in excess of itself, always being too much of a 
body to be fully present. All that is possible is to re-present it (in the 
act of fundamental misconceiving); and then there is also this other 
thing – we can touch upon it. 
Both the body and bodies (for it is almost a contradiction in terms to 
speak of only one single body without others already touching it, 
forming it, giving it its shape and turning it into that which then 
appears on the layer of re-presentation as one autonomous body) do 
not exist in time and space, they do not fill up space but are, quite the 
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contrary, the very site where space (as well as time) unfolds. Bodies 
do not belong to discourse or matter, they are not found in either mind 
or body, but are situated at the very “limit, qua limit.”152 It is in this 
regard that Nancy claims: 
“Bodies aren’t some kind of fullness or filled space (space 
is filled everywhere): they are open space, implying, in 
some sense, as space more properly spacious than spatial, 
what could also be called a place. Bodies are places of 
existence, and nothing exists without a place, a there, a 
‘here,’ a ‘here is,’ for a this.”153  
And also, since “the body makes room for existence”154, it is possible 
to understand this notion as the site of subjectivity, as that which is 
always “making room for them to create an event (rejoicing, suffering, 
thinking, being born, dying, sexing, laughing, sneezing, trembling, 
weeping, forgetting).”155 Or, in other words, the body is the place 
where the event of the process of subjectivity finds its Ur-Sprung 
(primal departure), though it does not begin from a singleton but from 
an understanding of the body which always slips away under its 
representation, where it is always bound to the one next to it, and 
begins a signifying chain of bodies touching upon bodies. Therefore, 
Nancy is right to identify the body as existence, and even more 
specifically as “the very act of ex-istence, being.”156 
In this respect, the body is neither substance (mere being, an a priori 
of matter formed by ideas afterwards), nor is it solely a process of 
signification; instead, it provides the site of the condition of possibility 
for mind as well as matter to arise – the body, it is sense.157 Yet 
because the body is not of discourse, does not find its place within 
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discourse, but is situated at discourse’s limit, it will always already 
evade sense, not because it is something different (radical alterity) in 
relation to sense, but because it is the place from which sense finds its 
Ur-Sprung, its primal departure. The body  is located at the very 
intersection of metonymy and metaphor that was introduced earlier as 
the site of subjectivity. An understanding of the body as that which 
evades sense (i.e. as a pre-discursive entity, a material or substance 
which has to be formed, modified, trimmed through sense in order to 
become meaningful) fails to notice that the body is the place of the 
production of any form of meaning at all. Therefore, there is no such 
thing as the body of a community prior to the notion of an individual 
body, of my body and yours. The bond which holds together this 
community is established through the passage from mine to yours, 
through me touching upon you, and you touching me – whereby we (as 
individuals as well as a communal ‘we’) will have been inaugurated. 
Sense is to be understood here as the plurality of Ur-Sprung, of primal 
departures, the repetition of Ur-Sprung, of the primal leap158 which 
forever separates us from ourselves, evicts us from the space of 
fullness of Being in order to throw us into being, into the register of 
knowledge, discourse, the reign of logos. This plurality of Ur-Sprung, 
this sense, is established between us (between me, you, and the 
o/Other). It is this plurality which is the basis of any form of 
community (i.e. of any form of encounter of me and the o/Other), but 
because this Ur-Sprung is also a form of breach that always separates 
the individual from primordial unity (which, of course, never as such 
existed but is only hypostasized in the aftermath of individuation), it 
renders visible the aporia this community will always be caught up in. 
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Every form of individuation discloses a gap, a minimal difference; Ur-
Sprung itself is indeed this very gab.159  
To say ‘community’ is to say ‘one to the other,’ even though 
something is lost along the way (and will always already have to be 
lost in order to even provide the conditions of possibility for one and 
the other). Call it sense, subjectivity, or call it the body. This 
primordial loss of the body is what Judith Butler establishes as the 
founding bond which connects all of us: 
“Despite our differences in location and history, my guess 
is that it is possible to appeal to a ‘we,’ for all of us have 
some notion of what it is to have lost somebody. Loss has 
made a tenuous ‘we’ of us all.”160 
We are searching for what we have lost, looking for it in the o/Other, 
wanting the o/Other to give back to us what has gone missing along 
the way. We want the o/Other to give back to us our body, to hold our 
body and form one perfect set of parentheses in our embracement of 
the other.161 And yet there is this almost unbearable ambivalence: 
‘Can you hold me a second!? … Don’t touch me … Don’t touch me! 
… Don’ …”. For there is not only love in the way we hold each other, 
in the ways we encounter one another, there is also the other side of 
the coin – there is also violence. In searching for us, we have to 
expose ourselves to the o/Other, our face, skin, hands … our body. 
Political life is thus to be regarded as the exposure of the political 
body (and I doubt there is a form of the body that is not political) – of 
us as political bodies within a community (to come) which renders it 
necessary to consider the “complicity” of this very political life with 
the notion of violence. This is also Judith Butler’s starting point in her 
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essay Violence, Mourning, Politics, where she seeks to find a way to 
come to terms with this founding loss of the body as the community’s 
constitutive event: 
“I propose to consider a dimension of political life that has 
to do with our exposure to violence and our complicity in 
it, with our vulnerability to loss and the task of mourning 
that follows, and with finding a basis for community in 
these conditions. We cannot precisely ‘argue against’ 
these dimensions of human vulnerability, inasmuch as 
they function, in effect, as the limits of the arguable, even 
perhaps as the fecundity of the inarguable.”162 
In all the ways we may differ, there is still something which connects 
us to each other like a ‘great bond’163 and functions as the condition of 
any such thing as a universal structure. This is the fact that all of us 
have lost something, this very something that is to be graspable as 
sense (or Being) qua body. Whenever we get into contact with each 
other, something about this primordial loss (and our striving to 
compensate for it) is revealed; there is something within the other’s 
touch which “delineates the ties we have to others, that shows us that 
these ties constitute what we are, ties or bonds that compose us.”164 
The belief in an independent me over here and an equally autonomous 
you over there is a delusion Butler points out: 
“It is not as if an ‘I’ exists indepentendly over here and 
then simply loses a ‘you’ over there, especially if the 
attachment to ‘you’ is part of what composes who ‘I’ am. 
If I lose you, under these conditions, then I not only mourn 
the loss, but I become inscrutable to myself. Who ‘am’ I, 
without you? (…) On one level, I think I have lost ‘you’ 
only to discover that ‘I’ have gone missing as well.”165 
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But there is not only loss, there is also its other – there is also the 
encounter of finding the other. In finding you, I also find myself 
(which is another way of saying, love proper). But as Žižek never 
hesitates to point out, this form of love is also ridden with violence. I 
find you and in you, I find what has been missing in me, but this Ding 
(thing) that has been missing must have gone missing in order for me 
to posit myself as an autonomous being. You, qua objet a (the missing 
part in the object around which all my desirous thoughts are 
circulating – $ <> a) are in fact too-much166, you are my excess. In 
other words, the other is what constitutes us as beings within a social 
contract, within a symbolic community of beings; but she is also a 
fundamentally violent threat, coming too close and threatening to 
unbind all the carefully bound bondages which hold together the 
other’s representation as an autonomous being, next to her (in safe 
distance – distance is important).  
Analytic experience provides us with two chief strategies for 
repression,167 for coping with the o/Other qua objet a (and, as such, as 
excess or too-muchness), which both have to be conceptualized in 
relation to the fundamental fantasy ($<>a). What I am referring to 
here is the split between how desire is articulated by obsessive 
neurotics as opposed to by hysterics. Put simply, while the obsessive 
simply refuses to acknowledge that the object she desires bears any 
form of relationship to the o/Other, “in the hysteric’s fantasy (…), 
separation is overcome as the subject constitutes herself, not in 
relation to the erotic object she herself has ‘lost,’ but as the object the 
Other is missing.”168 
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But this presents us with a massive problem: let us say that we have 
two people trying to get through to each other – two bodies wanting to 
touch and be touched. On the one hand, we have someone who tries to 
cope with this primordial loss by simply blocking the possibility of 
there being something like an o/Other on whom she could depend– a 
case of megalomania, the false conclusion of a presupposition of 
complete autonomy; but on the other hand, we have someone who 
disregards the very same fact in repressing her own lack by turning 
herself into the o/Other’s lack, by wanting to become what the o/Other 
is lacking. But the o/Other does not want to see that she is lacking 
something, does not want to be faced with the o/Other qua desired 
object – an almost impossible situation that is our human condition. 
The way we encounter each other, the way we encounter each other’s 
bodies is thus necessarily ridden with violence – hence the relation 
between love, guilt, and shame. 
Neurotic persons have a hard time dealing with this alienation in and 
through the o/Other in her otherness. This becomes especially obvious 
when we undo one another, when we are undone by the other, i.e. 
when we do each other. During sexual intercourse (where is the 
other’s body closer to ours then during the act of sleeping with each 
other?), we are often appalled by the face of the other, by the moans, 
grimaces and smells that disgust us (hysteric pattern) or make us feel 
guilty (obsessive pattern).169 It seems as if the mask has finally fallen 
from the partner’s face and a much more primal, much more savage 
creature is leaping at us from beneath. At the same time, we may also 
be shocked by our own behavior, by the way we seem to lose control 
over our own bodies, our own senses, our own mind. A body touching 
another body – the constitution of a we, as well as the undoing of the 
fallacious re-presentation of the singular body as an autonomously 
                                                           
169
 For this see for example: Fink, Bruce: A Clinical Introduction to Lacanian 
Psychoanalysis.  
85 
 
functioning unit.170 The path between jouissance and aggression in 
this game is a narrow one. We desire the other’s body but we are 
equally scared by its threat to undo us, by the way we are torn apart 
with and through this other. An encounter of this sort is first of all two 
folded: it is alienating as well as it is painful (pleasure and pain here 
are only two sides of the same coin) – And again: ‘Can you hold me a 
second!? … Don’t touch me … Don’t touch me! … Don’ …’ Doing 
and undoing – long for it; we need it. 
What is probably the most famous illustration of this ‘Don’t touch me’ 
– at least in the Western world – comes from none other than Jesus’s 
address to Mary Magdalen: Noli me tangere. Nancy delineates the 
fundamental ambivalence which lies enclosed in these words:  
“Either it resonates with the threatening tone of an affront: 
don’t touch me; don’t even try to touch me, or I’ll strike 
you. You won’t be spared! Don’t touch me; you have no 
idea how much violence I’m capable of. It is a final 
warning (…). In this sense, the interjection or the 
injunction itself constitutes an incitement to violence. It 
could be that he who issues it is one who wants 
violence.”171 
Or else, the phrase resonates less as an order than as a plea made in an 
excess of pain or pleasure (jouissance). “Don’t touch me, for I cannot 
bear this pain on my wounds any longer – or this intense pleasure, 
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aggravated to the point of becoming intolerable. I can no longer suffer 
it or enjoy (jouir) it.”172 
And, of course, there is also the ambivalence Billy Brown presents to 
us: ‘Don’t touch me’ is a wish to be touched, to be held – ‘Can you 
hold me a second … Don’t touch me … Don’t touch me! … Don’ …’ 
This is the moment when the body as place (site of subjectivity) 
unfolds, when suffering can be enjoyed and enjoying can suffer. 
“Don’t wish it, don’t even try to touch this point of rupture, for 
indeed, I would be shattered by it.”173 It is the potential enclosed in 
our neighbor – in our neighbor’s touch, her face. So how can and 
should we love this neighbor if the task of fundamentally tearing us 
apart is in her hands? Instead of giving up on the claim for sameness 
which is to be found at the core of universality (loss as a constitutive 
factor of community, a loss that each and everyone of us had to 
undergo) and replacing it with a respect for the otherness of the 
o/Other – as Levinas suggests – we should not fail to acknowledge the 
utterly inhuman dimension of the Neighbor.174 To illustrate this 
ambivalence between love and hatred at the heart of my neighbor, that 
fundamental and constitutive too-muchness the o/Other presents to us, 
let us turn to Zizek’s elaboration of this notion: 
“It is for this reason that finding oneself in the position of 
the beloved is so violent, traumatic even: being loved 
makes me feel directly the gap between what I am as a 
determinate being and the unfathomable X in me which 
causes love. Lacan’s definition of love (‘Love is giving 
something one doesn’t have …’) has to be supplemented 
with: ‘… to someone who doesn’t want it.’ Indeed, are we 
aware that Yeats’s wellknown lines describe one of the 
most claustrophobic constellations that one can imagine? 
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Had I the heavens’ embroidered cloths, 
Enwrought with golden and silver light, 
The blue and the dim and the dark cloths 
Of night and light and the half-light, 
I would speard the cloths under your feet: 
But I, being poor, have only my dearms; 
I have spread my dreams under your feet, 
Tread softly because you tread on my dreams.”175 
 
The o/Other’s otherness is not a fundamental alterity, but something 
we know only too well. It is that which we long for but only in order 
to most carefully avoid it. To be presented with it is first of all not the 
emergence of an ethical imperative, but its very opposite – the state of 
exception of good and evil, love and hate ‘whereby suffering can be 
enjoyed and enjoying can suffer.’ For a start, we do not love our 
neighbor; we want her to leave us alone; we need to be left alone in 
order to, in the aftermath of this departure, be able to long for her. 
What can be preserved from this is that we (meaning I over here and 
you over there) are interlaced, we are interwoven, our bodies touching 
upon each other, doing and undoing each other at the same time. But 
the question that arises out of this is how to politically acknowledge 
this fact. For it is essential to most political movements to make a 
claim to bodily integrity and self-determination. In this sense, it is 
vital to hypostasize that our bodies are indeed our own and that “we 
are entitled to claim rights of autonomy over our bodies.”176 But at the 
same time, the body is always surrendered to the other, our skin and 
face exposed to the gaze of the other. As such, the body is always 
already marked by primordial vulnerability, by mortality, and also 
agency. “Although we struggle for rights over our own bodies, the 
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very bodies for which we struggle are not quite ever our own.”177 This 
is the paradox of the body – it is … and is not. It is always there, 
always re-presented, but nevertheless the other body, the one touching 
another body and thus the site of sense always evades our grasp. It is a 
necessary impossibility. This is how we should understand Butler’s 
claim that “Individuation is an accomplishment, not a presupposition, 
and certainly no guarantee.”178 And the felicity of this 
accomplishment does not depend on me alone, but first of all on the 
o/Other acknowledging me in my individuality. 
Through this the bond of the political body of a community to come is 
established; bodies touching upon bodies, undoing each other in order 
to inaugurate an I, you, and finally, a we. It is, however, a community 
that will never be fully realized, as it is caught up in the to come which 
is at the same time our search for it, i.e. our search for ourselves. It 
cannot be realized because the basis of this community is that 
something has always already been lacking from the start. What is 
lacking has – as demonstrated in Chapter 3 – is the constitutive 
negativity, the founding violence which exists prior to all forms of 
good and evil but – and because of this – provides for the rise of any 
such thing, the ‘great bond’ connecting all of us. 
In other words, what we are dealing with here is the fact that every 
society is built on a primordial Ur-Sprung (always to be thought as a 
multiplicity of departures, not a ‘single event’) which gives rise – qua 
loss – to the possibility of bodily re-presentation. Through this violent 
intervention, lives are produced and rendered re-presentable as parts 
of a community. But this will always already lack something, and this 
something is what has been accounted for as society’s zero of 
focalization, what is re-presented yet not present. As a result of this 
intervention, we have to come to terms with the fact that we are not all 
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‘equal in our fundamental otherness,’ that the face of the other is not 
the foundation of an ethical order or of any kind of respectful 
behavior, that lives are not all the same in their otherness. All our 
bodies matter179, but some seem to matter more than others: 
“Lives are supported and maintained differently, and there 
are radically different ways in which human physical 
vulnerability is distributed across the globe. Certain lives 
will be highly protected, and the abrogation of their claims 
to sanctity will be sufficient to mobilize the forces of war. 
Other lives will not find such fast and furious support and 
will not even qualify as ‘grievable.’”180 
This is the ‘inhuman dimension’ the other’s body presents us with. 
The bodies of those who, through the first violent act of the 
establishment of a community, have been excluded from this very 
community continue to haunt us, not because they have been 
immolated in order to found a new positively given order upon their 
graves, but because they remain within this positively given, closed 
and neatly ordered (according to an ethical order of being) space as 
the spectral negativity haunting this very order. They cannot be 
protected because there is no safe space for them to turn to and they 
cannot be mourned because they were always already the lost ones 
(providing the site where the rest can find themselves); they cannot be 
killed, because they have been undead from the very start, belonging 
only in their non-belonging. And lastly, they cannot participate in any 
‘rational discourse’ where all parties come together to negotiate, to 
respect each other and to give way to understanding and the force of 
the better argument (in other words to agonality instead of 
antagonism181) because they themselves are situated at the very limit 
of this discourse, establishing and (bodily) exposing the limits of 
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human intelligibility.182 ‘Can you hold me a second!? … Don’t touch 
me … Don’t touch me! … Don’ …’ – but this is exactly what we have 
to do: touching each other, touching upon one another and coming to 
terms with the (i.e. our) excess as materialized within the bodily 
representation of our neighbor. 
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6. Conclusion 
Broadly speaking, we have been concerned here with speaking about 
the limits of human intelligibility, with coming to grips with the 
notion of political intervention as an embodiment of the site of the 
event. This site has been approached from various sides: from the side 
of subjectivity and subjectivation, from the notion of the Utopian 
labor the work of art carries out on a day to day basis, as well as from 
the notion of the human body itself. These three approaches were 
chosen because, despite their variety, they still have something in 
common – they share the same structural position: subjectivity, art, 
and the body are three different fields which render it possible to 
speculate about the nature of the site of the event as the battlefield of 
‘true’ political intervention. 
As we have sought to point out, the concepts of subjectivity and 
subjectivation are indispensible to a proper understanding of political 
intervention. But the notion of the subject can no longer be grasped as 
autonomous– in which the subject exists as singular unit called into 
existence solely through the act of thinking herself (‘I think therefore I 
am’). Rather the concept of subjectivity has been delineated as a 
delicate interplay of metonymy and metaphor, as a vanishing category 
which cannot be sustained for very long, a category which will always 
already be caught up in its becoming at the same time as it will always 
already have vanished from the scene (of re-presentation) again – a 
necessary impossibility. In order to come to terms with this very 
notion, we have had to examine both its properties: it is the act of 
radical (metaphorical) intervention (Badiou’s claim) as well as it is 
constituted by the metonymic trace of a writing forth of signifiers 
(Derrida’s signifying chain); but – we have added – this interrelation 
of metonymy and metaphor is at the same time the interwovenness of 
recognition and non-recognition. Only if the seemingly nonsensical 
act of subjective intervention is taken as a sign (and followed) by the 
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o/Other will the constitutive negativity be sublated into the order of 
being (i.e. the order of re-presentation), thus counting this order anew 
and producing a more just framing of it.   
The work of art, the labor of a ‘true’ form of art (one which bears 
witness to a society’s constitutive void, i.e. an understanding of the 
aesthetic regime as closely tied to the field of re-presentation, that 
which provides the a priori backstage for anything to appear on the 
front stage) is the materialization of such a sign that gives both a 
resisting and a persisting body to the fleetingness of the vanishing 
force subjectivity presents us with. In this sense, art has been 
described not as an aesthetic practice but as a mode of thinking. The 
front stage’s discourse of re-presentation – which could also be 
referred to as the discourse of (scientific) knowledge – is one of loud 
and blithesome pattering, of fast words and an all-knowing discourse.  
It is this discourse of sophomoric words, metaphors, and analogies – 
re-presentation as certainty - which, however, forecloses the ability to 
see the constitutive lack as the founding gesture of this possibility of 
abundance of words. The work of art does not participate in this game 
of semblances, but rather strives to occupy the place of negativity, and 
thus becomes society’ minimal difference. As such, ‘true’ art – as was 
also the case for our elaboration of subjectivity – is construed from the 
void; although it is not the void it bears a distinct relation to it by 
giving form to the formative formlessness. Through this, it is marked 
by a deliberate letting go of power relations. To posit oneself in 
opposition to the system of re-presentations would still mean to 
participate in this discourse, to speak the same language. Art which 
remains caught up within the discourse (i.e. not being situated at the 
93 
 
very limit of discourse)  belongs to what Horkheimer/Adorno referred 
to as the field of Cultural Industry.183 
The work of art, however, is not of this language but has to be thought 
as the condition of possibility for discourse as such to arise. Of course 
it belongs to the symbolic system (there is nothing beyond the 
symbolic other than death as presence) but it must nevertheless be 
regarded as that system’s symptomal knot, its minimal displacement 
no longer caught up in power relations but the very focal point from 
which these relations arise. In art, the zero/One – which had been 
delineated in Chapter 3 as negative dialectics of subjectivity – is here 
presented to us in a materialized form. Artistic intervention may be 
conceived as nonsense or even terror as long as it is not picked up by 
the o/Other – it will continue to function as a society’s symptom – but 
if it is picked up, if it is believed and taken as a sign, it will give way 
to the new to come, thus being transformed (in the act of traversing the 
fantasy) from symptom to sinthome. 
So while art in general and artistic intervention (i.e. the work of art) 
in particular can and must be understood as a way of giving form to 
the formless space of constitutive negativity, a way of giving a body 
to the bodiless heteronomy; this body is still of a different kind than 
the other body we have been speaking of – our bodies. While the 
materialization of sense through art does not necessarily have a 
graspable body, a body that can be touched184, our own bodies are 
marked by the ability to be touched, by us and by each other. What is 
specific to the notion of the body is that it is so close to us,; while art 
is something we can see, hear, experience, and sometimes even touch, 
we can turn away from it again. Our bodies, however, are something 
we cannot turn away from. We cannot do without either our own body 
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and – as was demonstrated above – or that of the other, both being 
indispensable to the formation of ourselves as I and you. The body, in 
the form of our bodies, is the possibility to touch upon the unfolding 
of sense in the other and through the other. 
It could be argued that these three notions – subject, art, body – differ 
in the way they can be touched upon, the subject being the most 
fleeting category that only appears in non-appearing, in continuously 
withdrawing in the form of a constantly vanishing mediator; art as a 
form of materialization of this subjective process which persists as 
well as it opens up the way for the new to come (always depending on 
the o/Other to take it as a sign, a symbol for a Utopian belief to arise); 
and the body as the corporeality of the unfolding of sense through the 
process of touching each other, exposing oneself to the o/Other and 
being touched/marked by an other. But at the same time these three 
categories have something fundamental in common – they all bear a 
distinct relation to the situation’s void, the site of the event, or to what 
can also be called the edge of the void; they are construed from it, but 
not really it. Instead, they can be understood as (more or less 
vanishing) mediators between the counted set of re-presentation and 
the heteronomy of the void. Subject, art, and the body – they are the 
link between void (Ø) and One, a zero of focalization. 
An understanding of these notions along the aforementioned lines 
renders it necessary to take a different path towards the 
conceptualization of the notion of politics in general and radical 
political intervention in particular. What we generally refer to as 
‘political actions’ (i.e. day-to-day parliamentary politics within the 
democratic sphere) are in fact a form of ‘weak politics’; what Badiou 
even goes so far as to call ‘sophistry.’185 This stage sophistry exists as 
a place for re-presentations where everybody seems to count the same, 
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where all can come together in their freedom of speech and can argue. 
In the end, the ‘better argument’ will win as long as we keep listening 
to and respecting each other. This form of politics will, however, 
always already remain bound to the given set of norms and values 
insofar as it is unable to operate within the system while grasping the 
conditions of possibility of this very system. It is thus unable to come 
to terms with its founding violence and will, therefore, be unable to 
produce a more just version through the re-inscription of this 
negativity in the form of a fundamental re-signification of all given 
parameters.  
But this is exactly the potential a philosophy which does not give up 
on the notion of subjectivity, artistic intervention, and body politics is 
able to conceptualize – that is, it renders this formative negativity 
productive for the process of political intervention. For “(w)hat 
philosophy is able to record, in the unfolding of previously unseen 
possibilities, the sign of a renewed ‘thinkability’ (…) of politics 
conceived on the basis of its own exercise.”186 Weak politics cannot 
think the new from the given order (which is the very order of this 
kind of politics) because from the perspective of this order the new 
will always appear as unthinkable, as a scandalon, a terrorist threat; 
only afterwards, après coup, this new will always have been a 
necessity to come. This is possible because the very conditions of 
being have been altered – the set has been counted anew. Weak, 
system immanent, politics that have lost their relation to the void can 
only produce pseudo-events, happenings and interventions which, at 
first glance, may seem like radical re-structurings of the situation but 
which are nevertheless feverishly preoccupied with upholding the 
status quo. Or, in psychoanalytic words, they enjoy their symptom at 
the same time as they cover it up, not seeing it, instead of working 
through it by traversing of the fantasy. This form of politics runs along 
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the line of norm and its immanent excess, as has been pointed out by 
our eximantion of Lacan’s Lettre d’Amour in Chapter 3. The norm 
will produce its fundamental Other, a wholly other that always holds a 
relationship of complicity to that norm. This other, however, does not 
have anything in common with the primordial exclusion which the 
given order is founded upon, but only seems to do so – a register of 
semblances. Reintegrating this excess of semblances will not change 
the status quo; quite the opposite, it will only make it more powerful, 
like a virus spreading out and becoming more and more resistant 
through the little portions of poison it encounters. 
This becomes especially obvious in artistic production within the field 
of the culture industry; but it holds equally true for body politics. The 
seeming excess provided by a plethora of fashions, musical styles, and 
artistic interventions may at first glance appear as a threat to the 
system, but the seamless incorporation of this ‘other’ within the 
‘mainstream’ of capitalist society demonstrates exceptionally well that 
here we are not dealing with a fundamental breach that can transform 
the given parameters but only with its immanent excess. This is also 
the problem that the sexual liberation movement is facing. Although 
we liberated ourselves from clothing and monogamy, it is striking to 
what extent our society is still facing a conservative backlash at the 
moment – pseudo events, unable to really liberate themselves from 
their complicity with (capitalist) violence by acknowledging this very 
complicity. 
In the register of re-presentation as an order of pseudo events, the 
excluded (Chapter 5), the ones that belong only in their non-
belonging, will remain backstage, forever haunting the positively 
given front stage. On this level, respect and responsibility is all good 
and well and – as has been delineated – is also necessary in day-to-day 
politics to work with models of bodily integrity and autonomy – this is 
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the level of imaginary closure187 (and on the level of the imaginary, 
which is the level of our everyday lives, the structures are closed; we 
have a body which functions as a singular unit, and we are 
autonomously thinking beings). But something will always already be 
left outside of this discourse because it marks the limit of that very 
discourse, qua unfolding of sense.  
The difficult task is  the following: while we remain on the imaginary 
level of our daily encounters, we are led to believe that a frictionless 
politics, a politics without violent rupture, may be possible; but we 
also have to acknowledge the fact that every society (and in fact, as 
has been shown above, every form of interaction – because the 
concept itself is split – and as such, the symbolic order we live in and 
are inaugurated by) is built on a distinct primordial violence that 
brings into being the positively given  at the same time as it excludes 
others – othering the other which will henceforth belong only in its 
non-belonging, forever haunting us in its unaccounted presence. 
By working towards the acknowledgement of this founding violence 
we have already – by the mere act of framing it in language – taken 
the first step in the production of a new count which will have 
inaugurated a new system of beliefs. “We perform the recognition by 
making the claim, and this is surely a very good ethical reason to 
make the claim.”188 In differentially re-peating the norms of the given 
order (i.e. in making use of the symbolic system at the limits of this 
very system), we will be able to re-sign – to re-sign from it (letting it 
be, letting power fall in not participating in the system’s logic of norm 
and immanent excess) and re-sign it, (i.e. put our own signature 
beneath it) – and thus change it fundamentally –re-signifying the 
status quo. 
                                                           
187
 Lukács, Georg: Theory of the Novel. 
188
 Butler, Judith: Precarious Life, p.43. 
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Abstract (english version) 
My thesis seeks to trace back the conditions and relevance of the 
notions of subject, subjectivity, and subjectivation for processes of 
(political) intervention. The first part is designed to serve as a 
theoretical introduction, drawing on Jacques Lacan’s notions of 
metonymy and metaphor, linking and rendering them fruitful for a 
comparison of the different approaches Jacques Derrida and Alain 
Badiou take towards an understanding of the notion of the subject. 
Through a close reading of these authors an understanding of 
subjectivity shall be provided which is able to take into account the 
necessity of a (negative) dialectics of recognition in the process of 
subjective constitution. The second part of the thesis encompasses 
three essays which – although they differ according to their subject 
matter – revolve around the notions delineated in the first part and 
which seek to render fruitful the insights gained in the theoretical 
analysis. These three essays focus on the notions of recognition and 
violence (Chapter 3), the political potentials of the work of art 
(Chapter 4), and the notions of body and the o/Other (Chapter 5). 
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Abstract (german version) 
Die hier vorliegende Arbeit setzt sich mit Fragen rund um die 
Begriffe: Subject, Subjektivierung und Subjektivität auseinander. Der 
erste Teil umfasst eine theoretische Herangehensweise an die Materie. 
Ausgehend von Jacques Lacans Theorie bezüglich der Interdependenz 
von Metonymie und Metapher sowie dessen Bedeutung für den 
Prozess der Subjektkonstitution sollen ins besonders die 
unterschiedlichen Zugänge betrachtet werden, die Jacques Derridas 
Theorie einerseits und Alain Badious Zugang zur Materie auf der 
anderen Seite auszeichnen. In der genauen Analyse dieser Autoren 
soll eine Konzeptualisierung des Subjektbegriffs angestrebt werden, 
die die Notwendigkeit einer bestimmten Form der (negativen) 
Anerkennungsdialektik für den Subjektivierungsprozess offenlegt. Der 
zweite Teil der Arbeit umfasst drei Essays, die – obwohl sie in ihrer 
Thematik divergieren – um die in Teil 1 dargelegten Konzepte und 
Theorien kreisen und versuchen, diese für das jeweilige Feld fruchtbar 
zu machen. Diese Kapitel setzten sich mit Fragen der 
Annerkennungsdialektik (Kapitel 3), des Werks der Kunst (Kapitel 4) 
sowie dem Begriff des Körpers und der Körperlichkeit (Kapitel 5) 
auseinander. 
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